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ABSTRACT
Hazardous materials transport is a significant economic activity. Routing is 
one of the key issues in hazardous materials transport. Cost and risk are primary 
factors influencing routing. Emergency preparedness is an issue that is common 
to all of these. Traditionally, risks and emergency preparedness have been 
addressed as two interdependent issues, but the interactions between them have 
not been addressed explicitly. This often results in risk estimates that ignore the 
effect of emergency preparedness.
This research presents a framework for quantifying effects of emergency 
preparedness on risk of hazardous materials transportation. Risk estimates are 
typically based on the probability of accident, probability of a release given an 
accident, and consequence. An emergency response factor, 6, is introduced to 
obtain a modified estimate of risk. The modified risk is termed effective risk and 
considers emergency preparedness. Effective risk is defined as a product of 6 and 
initial risk derived using the probabilistic risk methodology. Emergency 
preparedness is measured in terms of response times and capabilities of initial 
responders. Initial responders were assumed to be fire units. Travel time is used 
to represent response times, which were evaluated using a Geographic 
Information System (GIS) program. Capabilities include personnel availability, 
personnel training, personal protective equipment, and general control equipment. 
These were evaluated using a rating scheme. Three indices were introduced to
iv
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represent response times and capabilities. These are the travel time index, 
response unit index, and response capability index. These indices were used to 
estimate emergency response factor.
A case study of three major routes 1-15, US-95, and US-93 in Clark 
County, Nevada is presented to illustrate the emergency preparedness based risk 
assessment methodology. The study shows that the effective risk tends to 
decrease with emergency preparedness and increase with the lack of it. In 
metropolitan areas where emergency responders are immediately available, 
effective risks are lower than the initial risk estimates. For the three routes 
analyzed, the critical segments identified in the initial risk analysis remained 
critical, despite the inclusion of emergency preparedness. These were the 
segments with either high accident rates or population density, or a combination 
of both. Route segments, with no or relatively poor emergency response 
capability, which were not initially identified to be high risk have been highlighted 
in the effective risk estimates. These segments were shown to be as important as 
those which were identified to be critical. Emergency response is significant in 
areas where the responders are not available within the 10-minute travel time.
Effective risk estimates could support decision and policy making, resource 
management, developing hazardous materials routing criteria, identifying critical 
links and areas, addressing questions of equity and risk distribution, and re­
evaluating "disjoint" techniques that are currently being used.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On February 22, 1978 at 10:30 PM, 24 tank cars derailed in downtown 
Waverly, Tennessee. Forty hours after the derailment, a derailed tank car 
carrying 27,871 gallons of liquefied petroleum gas (propane) exploded, lighting up 
the sky like a fireball. Sixteen people were killed and more than 80 were severely 
burned. A sizeable portion of the downtown was destroyed and chaos reigned as 
people ran for their lives in 1700-degree heat (Cashman, 1988). For almost two 
days after the Waverly derailment, little action had been taken to remove the tank 
cars or transfer their cargo and warn the people of the potential danger of the 
derailed tank cars. If there had been adequate emergency response to  the event, 
perhaps the explosion could have been avoided and lives could have been spared.
Catastrophes, such as this, which involved the transport of hazardous 
materials, are rare, but it can and "it will happen again, and again, and again." 
And so, with the growing awareness to the potential danger of hazardous 
materials, people have developed the "Not In My BackYard" (NIMBY) syndrome 
(Matthews, 1990) - a natural resistance to hazardous materials activity. This 
potential for a rare event with uncertain but often catastrophic outcome coupled
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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with the need to ensure public safety, emphasizes the importance of evaluating 
risk and emergency preparedness along hazardous materials transport corridors.
Routing, risks and emergency preparedness are among the most critical 
issues in the shipment of hazardous materials. Existing routing models are based 
on a number of criteria such as cost, safety, population exposed, distance, risk and 
equitable risk distribution. Policy issues have also been included in the routing 
criteria. O ther issues, like emergency response preparedness, although recognized 
as important and affecting routing decisions, have been usually alluded to but not 
explicitly included in routing analysis. Risk assessment provides a basis for 
routing hazardous materials and developing mitigation plans and prioritization, 
and enacting legislation to protect public safety and the environment. Thus, 
decisions on route selection should consider estimates of risk along potential 
routes.
Risk and emergency preparedness are critical decision factors in the 
selection of hazardous materials transportation routes. While risk and emergency 
preparedness are two interdependent factors, the interactions between them are 
not explicitly considered in routing decisions. Several models have been 
developed which address routing and risk together. However, there is currently 
no generally acceptable model that relates route selection to both risk and 
emergency preparedness. Thus, there exists a pressing need to modify current 
routing practices to reflect the interactions between risk and emergency 
preparedness during route evaluations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1.1 Background
Annually, there are 100 million hazardous materials shipment across the 
United States (US DOT, 1993). The total volume of movement approximates 4 
billion tons per year (List and Tumquist, 1993). While the accident record with 
respect to such shipments may be "good", the probability of an accident taking 
place should not be discounted, given the unstable nature of some materials and 
their potential for catastrophe should an accident occur. W hat is of ultimate 
concern is the risk of any ’event’ (incident or accident). It is to be recognized that 
risk is a function of the probability of the event and its consequence (Abkowitz, 
1990). Souleyrette and Sathisan (1994) addressed the development of Geographic 
Information System (GIS) based applications for high level radioactive material 
transportation analysis and identified three methodologies for routing analysis - 
comparative study, worst case assessment, and probabilistic risk assessment.
In order to discuss issues related to hazardous materials transportation, it 
would be useful to develop a basic understanding of the nature of the materials 
and the regulations governing the transport of the same.
Characteristics o f Hazardous Materials. The United States (US) Department 
of Transportation (DOT) defines hazardous materials as "substances or materials 
which have been determined to be capable of posing an unreasonable risk to 
health, safety, and property when transported in commerce" (Cashman, 1988).
Hazardous materials are divided into nine classes (US DOT, 1993): 
explosives; gases; flammable and combustible liquids; flammable solids.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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spontaneously combustible materials, and dangerous when wet materials; oxidizers 
& organic peroxides; poisonous & etiologic (infectious) materials; radioactive 
materials; corrosives; and miscellaneous hazardous materials. Hazardous wastes 
such as spent nuclear fuels (SNF) from nuclear power reactors, high level wastes 
(HLW) and chemically reprocessed SNF are categorized as radioactive materials. 
Both SNF and HLW have a high concentration of radioactivity.
Regulations Governing Transport o f  Hazardous Materials. Some of the key 
players in the transport of hazardous materials and emergency response include 
the shippers, the carriers, professional societies, trade organizations, and 
regulatory agencies. Agencies with regulatory responsibilities exist at the 
international, federal, state, and local governmental levels. Included among such 
agencies at the national level are the Department of Transportation (USDOT), 
Federal Emergency M anagement Agency (FEMA), D epartm ent of Energy (DOE) 
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM), Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
These departments or agencies have respective responsibilities to enforce the 
regulations which have been enacted to ensure safe movement of hazardous 
materials.
Some of the regulations relating to the transport of hazardous and 
radioactive materials and emergency response at the national level include: 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) of 197.5, Hazardous Materials 
Transportation Uniform Safety Amendments Act (HMTUSA) of 1990;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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D epartm ent of Transportation (USDOT) HM-164 (49 CFR Part 177); Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986; the Federal Emergency 
M anagement Agency (FEMA) 44 CFR and Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 
1982; and the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA) of 1987.
1.2 Problem Statement
Several factors affect routing decisions for the transportation of hazardous 
materials. The primary factors include cost and risk. Cost is a function of mode, 
travel distance, travel time, material, and volume of material being shipped. 
Regulations also influence cost. Risk is influenced by a number of factors 
including population, traffic volume, and accident rate. O ther secondary factors 
include the physical condition of infrastructure (i.e. pavement, track), time of day, 
and time of year. These factors have been considered in some of the existing 
routing models to provide a more realistic assessment of hazardous materials 
transportation route. Another important issue but one which has not been 
explicitly addressed in routing is emergency preparedness. The response times 
and locations of emergency response facilities have important implications in 
route selection.
Risk, whether perceived or real, is heightened by the absence of adequate 
emergency response units in a community. Oftentimes, conditions are made 
worse due to the absence of or delay in providing emergency response. In other
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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instances, the emergency response unit may not have the capabilities or the 
resources needed to respond to an event appropriately.
Risk assessment is performed to provide an analytical basis for risk 
management and to identify various measures of mitigating and reducing risk.
With a detailed risk assessment, areas with highest and lowest risk potential can 
be identified and delineated. Decisions on routing, risk reduction measures, and 
response plans can be made using the results of risk assessment.
As stated previously, hazardous materials transportation-related risk could 
be considered a function of the probability of an accident, probability of a release 
given an accident, and potential consequences. Consequences could be exposure 
to population, environment, property, and infrastructure.
One method is to base risk estimates on the worst case condition. 
Population consequences translate to all people within the impacted area. This 
may be a veiy conservative assumption that would not compromise the 
consequence of an event. However, erring on the safe or conservative side may 
not always be acceptable due to the high cost o f decisions involved in satisfying 
this assumption. Decisions should be made with considerations to the shipper, the 
carrier, the public and the environment.
On the safety side, emergency response is becoming a dominant area of 
concern (Abkowitz, et al., 1991). The importance o f emergency response in 
providing timely actions in the event of an accident have been reflected in 
legislation enacted to ensure safety and to mitigate the consequences of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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undesirable events. Examples of legislation include HMTA, HMTUSA, Section 
180c of NWPAA and Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
It is apparent that a relationship exists between risk management and 
emergency preparedness. Bui currently, risk estimates do not include the 
quantitative effect of emergency response preparedness. This study aims to 
develop a methodology that will quantify the effect of emergency response on the 
consequence of an event and include this effect in risk analysis.
U  Research Objectives
The objectives of this research are as follows:
1. To develop a methodology for quantifying effects of emergency
response on risk analysis for hazardous materials transportation; and
2. To develop a framework for modeling risk which considers emergency
response along a selected route whenever significant changes in the 
surrounding environment occur.
Specific questions intended to be answered by this research include the 
following:
1. W hat are the linkages between risk and emergency preparedness?
2. Can a methodology be developed that will consider emergency
preparedness as a variable in risk analysis?
3. How sensitive are risk estimates to the effect of emergency response?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1.4 Significance and Feasibility of the Research
Risk in the transportation o f hazardous materials has been a significant 
issue since the late 1970s and will continue to be recognized as an equally 
im portant issue in the selection of hazardous materials transportation routes. 
Annually, the amount o f hazardous materials that are transported across the 
United States continue to increase. Despite numerous studies dealing with 
various aspects of risk, the analysis of risk estimates still suffer from problems of 
uncertainty, inaccuracy and incompleteness (Jenssen and Castleman, 1984). 
Incomplete information on existing databases, lack of standardized criteria for 
analyzing risk, inability to integrate social science factors (human factors) in risk 
analysis, and failure to recognize the interactions between the technical and 
nontechnical aspects of the system are only a few of the problems. Thus, there is 
a continuous effort to search for more representative risk estimates, and improved 
route selection procedures.
One aspect that has been recognized as im portant in hazardous materials 
transportation is emergency response. An association between risk and emergency 
response is clearly established. However, current approaches address risk and 
emergency response as two separate issues. This research provides a new 
approach that combines emergency response with risk analysis.
The proposed methodology generates results that could provide 
information needed for informed decision and policy making, resource 
management, developing hazardous materials routing criteria, identifying critical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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links and areas, addressing questions of equity and risk distribution, and re­
evaluating "disjoint" techniques that are currently being used.
1.5 Organization of the Report
This report consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction. 
Chapter 2 is a literature review on risk and emergency preparedness. Chapter 3 
presents some of the issues and factors affecting risk analysis. Chapter 4 is 
devoted to emergency preparedness. Chapter 5 presents analytical methods and 
data requirements. Chapter 6 is devoted to the evaluation of emergency response 
factor, Beta. Chapter 7 presents a case study involving selected routes of interest 
in Clark County, Nevada. Chapter 8, the last chapter, provides a summary and 
conclusions.
Appendices A to D were also included. Appendix A provides a detailed 
description of the analysis involving Geographic Information Systems. Appendix 
B contains accident and truck vehicle kilometer data. Appendix C is a 
compilation of data related to emergency responders, specifically fire stations. 
Appendix D presents a discussion on the simulation performed to evaluate the 
effects of multiple response units.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter presents a review of current literature on risk analysis and 
emergency preparedness. The first section is devoted mainly to risk analysis and 
its application. The second section provides a review of studies related to 
emergency preparedness and its role in risk analysis.
2.1 Risk Analysis
Parentela and Sathisan (1995 a,b), Souleyrette and Sathisan (1994), 
Abkowitz and Lepofsky (1993), Souleyrette, Sathisan and di Bartolo (1991), List, 
e t al. (1991), Harwood and Russell (1990), and Rowe (1983) document existing 
risk assessment models related to transportation of hazardous materials. List, 
Mirchandani, Tum quist and Zografos (1991) concluded that despite the existence 
of a variety of techniques of risk assessment, the quantification and treatm ent of 
risk continue to be one of the most important issues in hazardous materials 
transportation.
Several attempts have been made to analyze risk. Some of these efforts 
have led to the development of models to quantify risk. Examples of such models 
are summarized in Table 2.1. Despite these developments, "quantitative risk
10
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Table 2.1 Methods of Quantifying Risk 11
A u th o r M cxlel/Technique C om m ent
A ng and  Briscoe 
(1979)
D eveloped system risk m ethodology fo r highway, rail and 
air transpo rt based  on  frequency o f accidents
V eritas (1982) D eveloped risk analysis technique fo r the  assessm ent o f 
hazardous m aterials transporta tion  a lternatives 
expressing risk as a product o f all probabilities o f an 
event, an accident, a release, an  effect and loss
Philipson, e t al. 
(1983)
M easured risk in tenus  o f expected dam ages, injuries o r 
fatalities
A bkow itz and 
C heng (1988)
Expressed risk as a function o f probability  o f an incident 
leading to  a release, link distance and  dam age to  
population  and p roperty
Am ong the first ones to  apply 
estim ation  approach  to hazardous 
m aterials routing  problem ; 
com bined econom ic cost and risk 
cost m inim ization in selecting 
route
A nders and  O lsten 
(1990)
U sed G IS-bascd  risk analysis based  on population and 
use em ergency response as a  m easure  o f vulnerability
L asarrc, e t al 
(1990)
U sed G IS-based risk analysis with dam age to population  
as a m easure o f risk
F IIW A  m odel 
(M IW A , 1990)
M easured risk as  a function o f accident probability and 
consequence
'D ie probability  o f a  hazardous 
m aterials accident fo r a  rou te  
segm ent i m easured  as a  function 
o f accident ra te  fo r all vehicle 
types, segm ent length, and  the 
fraction o f all accidents that 
involve a  M azmat release; 
accident consequences m easured  
in term s o f personal injury and 
p roperty  dam age
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Table 2.1 Methods of Quantifying Risk (cont.) 12
A u th o r M odel/Technique C om m ent
K ansas S late 
U niversity 
(H arw ood  and 
Russell, 1990)
Uses risk and consequence factors to  evaluate risk based 
on  com m unity risk rating o f low, m edium , o r high
G opalan , K olluri 
and  Karwan (1990)
D eveloped a  m odel to  de term ine a  set o f  routes that 
m inim izes the to ta l risk o f travel and spread  risk 
equitably using a  L jgrangian  process
G lickinan (1991) E stim ated  risk as a function o f  the volum es o f activity 
and the corresponding expected consequences per unit 
volum e o f activity
Identified traffic accidents and 
con tainer failures as the two 
m ajor con tribu to rs  to  the 
expected consequence o f  a release
R A D  l-RAN Code 
(1987-1993)
Calculates population  radiological risk associated with 
transpo rt o f radioactive m aterials. Risk is m easured  in 
term s o f dose o r radiological health  effects, and potentia l 
econom ic consequence
Developed at Sandia National 
I-aboratories
A LK ’s PC 
H azR oute  (1994)
D istribution  risk decision support tool for evaluating risk 
by rail and highway using societal risk
R ISK IN G  (1995) C alculates radiological consequences and health risks to 
an individual o r population  from  transporta tion  o f  spent 
nuclear fuel
D epartm ent o f Energy m odel
assessment (QRA) continues to be at an infant stage of development, plagued by 
problems of recognition, precision and credibility" (Saccomanno and Cassidy, 
1994). Golding and White (1990) stated that there is a need for a comprehensive 
risk assessment which integrates various factors such as "uncertainties, human- 
technical interactions, social forces, and iterative relationship with risk 
management strategies" that have not been addressed in traditional risk 
assessment.
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2.1.1 Applications
One of the most common applications of risk analysis is in making routing 
decisions. Risk minimization has been used as one of the objective functions in 
various routing models by Sathisan & Madhavapeddi (1995); Abkowitz (1993);
List and Mirchandani (1991); Revelle, Cohon and Shorbys (1991); Zografos and 
Davis (1989); Rhyne (1990); Lasarre, Fedra and Weigkricht (1990); and Abkowitz 
and Cheng (1988).
The Kansas State University (KSU) model rates community risk as low, 
medium, or high and uses risk factor and consequence factor to evaluate risk 
(Harwood and Russell, 1990). Risk factor considers the type and quantity of 
hazardous materials while consequence factor addresses the environment, 
population density, properties, and manufacturing and storage. In New Mexico, 
factors considered in state route designations include normal radiation exposure, 
public health risk from accidents, and economic risk from accidents (New Mexico 
State Highway and Transportation Department, 1991). California and Colorado 
utilized risk assessment in designating an intrastate routing network (Abkowitz, 
1993).
Probabilistic risk assessment was applied by Souleyrette and Sathisan 
(1994), Souleyrette, Sathisan and di Bartolo (1991), and H ubert and Pages (1989) 
for hazardous materials routing. Lange, Grundler and Schwarz (1992) compared 
the transport accident risk for rail and highway modes for the proposed repository 
in Konrad, Germany. Risk is evaluated in terms of expected frequency
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distributions between the potential radiation exposure and expected frequency of 
occurrence. Abkowitz and Lepofsky (1993) combined both screening (qualitative) 
and quantitative risk analysis to estimate the risk of transporting poisonous gas.
Russell and Kempe (1991) analyzed both individual (on-route and off- 
route) and societal risk for the transport of hydrogen sulfide using accident 
frequency and severity category, release probability, weather stability, and 
population exposure as some of the risk factors.
Abkowitz (1993) addressed both perceived and actual risk for chlorine 
shipment in southern California using actual risk minimization and perceived risk 
minimization as routing criteria. Kornhauser, et al. (1994) used PC HazRoute, a 
distribution risk decision support tool, for evaluating the risk of moving anhydrous 
ammonia by rail and highway using minimum societal risk. Purdy (1993) used 
societal risk in evaluating the risk of transporting chlorine. Purdy’s analysis 
includes motorists on the road where an incident occurs, passengers, and the 
people who live within the affected area. Riley (1993) performed a 
comprehensive quantified highway and rail national societal risk analysis for on- 
system and off-system population for different types of explosives. Maximum 
individual risk was addressed by Weiner, Neuhauser, and Kanipe (1993) using 
Transportation Individual Center Line Dose (TICLD) and RADTRAN 4. 
RADTRAN (Neuhauser and Kanipe, 1992) and RISKIND (Yuan, et al., 1995) 
were developed to determine both individual and societal risks for transporting 
radioactive materials.
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Rowe (1983) stated that absolute risk is very difficult to estimate as it will 
require consideration of various probability factors such as the probability of an 
incident on a mode segment based on infrastructure type and conditions, traffic 
levels, traffic hazards, congestion and vehicle type; probability of an incident of 
various severity classes; probability of release of various cargo types in an amount 
of spill of a various size classes; probability of release spreading by pathway (e.g. 
plume); probability of ignition for a flammable or explosive material via a certain 
path; probability of wind direction; probability of damage to an area receiving the 
spill; number of people exposed; and the probability that the exposed persons will 
die or be injured.
2.2 Risk and Emergency Preparedness
In a 1991 conference on high level waste materials, Abkowitz, et al. (1991) 
noted that emergency response is becoming a dominant area of concern and that 
risk aversion, risk equity, emergency response and proximity of sensitive facilities 
are emerging as other factors to consider in risk analysis. O ther studies have 
recognized the significance of emergency response in minimizing the consequence 
of an accident. Raj and Glickman (1986), in their risk study involving chlorine 
and LPG, performed sensitivity analyses to evaluate the effect of conducting 
emergency evacuation. They concluded that the payoff is generally higher in more 
severe accidents. Anders and Olsten (1990) used GIS to assess risks and 
vulnerability of population by integrating emergency response times and capability.
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Pijawka, et al. (1990), in assessing community vulnerability, addressed 
emergency preparedness/response using qualitative analysis. Chiang, e t al. (1990) 
assessed community safety by comparing risk and emergency preparedness. The 
model evaluated emergency preparedness as a function of emergency response 
capability and regulation compliance. Emergency response capability is measured 
using a rating of 1 to 10 for manpower availability, training level, communication 
capability, response time, equipment availability, public awareness, and factors 
dealing with the community’s emergency plans/programs. A  level of safety (A to 
F) was assigned for various ratios of community preparedness and risk.
The FHW A (1994) guideline measures emergency response capability in 
terms of the number of response units within a 10-minute response time per route 
length. FHWA recommends that the response capability be considered 
qualitatively rather than quantitatively when evaluating the relative risk of two 
highway route alternatives.
Simultaneous routing and siting of emergency response teams for high level 
radioactive waste shipment was addressed by List and Turnquist (1993). Hancock, 
et. al (1993) developed a methodology for providing an effective emergency 
response based on information about the responders, possible incidents, time 
involved and available qualified responders.
The 1987 Canadian Screening Method used a quantitative approach in 
consideration of emergency response capabilities in risk assessment. Relative risk 
is estimated as a function of probability, exposure, and response capability.
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Response capability is based on the number of trained fire squads and police cars 
available within a 10-minute response period (Harwood and Russell, 1990).
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CHAPTERS
ISSUES AND FACTORS AFFECTING RISK ANALYSIS
The importance of risk analysis in transporting dangerous goods has been 
recognized as early as the 1970s when the National Transportation Safety Board 
conducted a special study on the risk concepts in dangerous goods transportation. 
It recommended that the Departm ent of Transportation "initiate the development 
of a risk-based framework for evaluation and planning of dangerous goods 
transportation safety regulations or programs..." (NTSB, 1971).
After almost more than twenty years, laws and regulations designed to 
improve the safety condition of hazardous materials have been promulgated 
(Abkowitz, et al., 1991; Battelle, et al., 1993). However, an agreement on the 
most significant factors to be considered and a method for a standardized 
approach to risk-assessment have yet to evolve.
3.1 Definition of Risk
Risk in hazardous materials transportation may be considered to be the 
potential for realizing undesired impacts or any negative consequence. Early 
definitions refer to risk as the "functional combination of the probability of 
occurrence of a consequence and its value to the risk taker" (Rowe, 1975). The
18
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potential for an undesired impact could mean one accident out of "X" shipments 
of material type ”Y" leading to the release of a "Z" plume. Consequence could be 
the inhalation of "Z" by "N" number of people around the vicinity of the accident.
Recent definitions of risk identify the probability of an accident and the 
probability of occurrence as two separate phenomena affecting the consequence of 
an event. This may be expressed as (Souleyrette and Sathisan, 1994; Abkowitz 
and Lepofsky, 1993; Souleyrette, et al, 1991):):
Risk P  { Event ) X Consequence (3-la)
Risk y  ( Acc') y. P  { Rel \ Ace) x Consequence (3-lb)
where:
P(Event) = probability of an event (accident or incident)
P(Acc) = probability of an accident
P(Rel\Acc) = probability of a release given an accident
As can be noted, risk analysis deals with only two major variables: the 
probability and the consequence as illustrated in Figure 3.1. These two variables 
combine five variables that affect the risk estimate: the accident rate, the 
probability of release, the volume and rate of release, the hazard area, and the 
consequences to exposed population, property and the environment (Solway,
1992). Each of these five variables, in turn, is affected by various other variables 
shown in rectangular boxes. Examples of these variables are accident rate.
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Figure 3.1 Components of Risk
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shipment frequency, shipment volume, travel distance, time of day and weather 
condition for the probability of an accident. Variables affecting the probability of 
release are frequency, volume and rate of release; accident type; container type; 
packaging type; and meteorology. These are shown in rectangular boxes in Figure
3.1. O ther tertiary factors influencing risk are shown in parallelograms. For 
example, under the accident probability, such factors include human factors, road 
condition, mechanical failure, and other external factors; under release probability, 
factors include container failure, accident type and severity, and human factors; 
and under consequence, factors include type of material, impact area, 
meteorology, time of day and emergency response.
The interactions among these factors complicate risk analysis and 
contribute to uncertainties of the estimate. Assumptions are made for many input 
param eters such as in the calculation of accident rates, estimation of hazard areas, 
population density distributions, weather conditions, rates of release, average 
quantities released, effects of mitigation, and the availability and effectiveness of 
an emergency response. The following discussion addresses some of the most 
common issues and factors affecting risk analysis.
3.2 Issues in Risk Analysis
Uncertainty. Despite a number of advances that have taken place in the 
area of risk analysis, risk analysis continues to suffer from inconsistencies in the 
estimates. Saccomanno and Bakir (1991) pointed out two sources of uncertainty
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as uncertainty in the estimates and uncertainty of the process. Existing databases 
do not provide for adequate risk analysis in that analysts depend only on what is 
available. The inadequacy of data, plus the differences in assumptions used, 
contribute to uncertainty in the analysis. The problem of uncertainty has been 
addressed by Saccomanno, et al. (1989), Glickman (1991), and Tum quist (1987).
Perceived Vs. Actual. One of the issues confronting the transportation of 
hazardous materials is the wide disparity between the public’s perceived risk and 
the experts’ estimated risk. Unless the disparity is made smaller between the two 
groups, the social cost of risk would always be veiy high. The underlying causes 
of conflicts between public and expert risk assessment are summarized in Table
3.1. The table illustrates the differences in the approach to risk assessment 
between the public and the experts, as well as some of the problems causing 
conflicts between the two.
Perceived risk is evaluated by the public in terms of hazard, consequence, 
and values and beliefs. Perceived risk can be measured from surveys of people 
representing various interest groups within a society and is often influenced by 
culture. Decisions should reflect the priorities and values indicated by the public.
Actual or estimated risk is evaluated by experts or scientists analytically in 
terms of hazard, consequence and probability. Actual risks can be reduced by 
reducing the probability of an accident, controlling the magnitude of potential 
releases in case of an accident, and reducing the likelihood of a release in case of 
an accident (Turnquist, 1987).
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Table 3.1 Perceived Vs. Actual Risks
Public Experts
A PPR O A C H
•  H azard 0 H azard
•  Consequence 0 Consequence
•  V alues and beliefs 0 Technical and scientific
PROBLEM
•  unable to  understand the process 0 unable to  communicate results
fully effectively
•  lack of trust on the institution and 0 considers public’s risk perception as
experts irrational
•  focus on risk with little consideration 0 focus on cost reduction with little
o f benefit consideration of risk
Generally for the transport of hazardous materials, the public’s perception 
of risk is usually higher than actual risk. In relation to hazardous materials, the 
public is concerned only with zero risk which could mean complete eradication of 
hazardous materials transport or elimination of accidents. The benefits of or 
reasons for transporting these materials often plays a minor role in the minds of 
the general public.
Societal Vs. Individual. Generally, risk is estimated in terms of societal and 
individual risks. Saccomanno and Shortreed (1993) defined societal and individual 
risks as follows: Societal risk is an expectation of all possible damages posed by 
an activity over an extended period of time for all adversely affected locations.
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Societal risk is commonly expressed as fatality versus number of occurrence curve 
measured in terms of fatalities per year (Solway, 1992; Saccomanno and Cassidy, 
1994). Individual risk deals with potential threats to individuals at specific 
locations with respect to a given transportation corridor or route. This type of 
risk is usually smaller than societal risk.
Relative Vs. Absolute. Absolute risks are simply "abstractions posing as 
truth" (Solway, 1992, Saccomano and Cassidy, 1994). Due to uncertainties in risk 
estimation, an estimation of absolute risk is considered unattainable. Relative 
risks are concerned only with the general relationship between historic risk 
information and actual occurrences. Relative risks are more practical, meaningful 
and more commonly used in risk estimation. Saccomano and Cassidy noted in the 
1992 Consensus Conference on the Risks of Transporting Dangerous Goods that 
participants are united in saying: "What is of interest to the decision-maker is not 
the true value of risk, but rather insights gained on the risks involved, whether 
one activity is safer than another and the degree to which this is the case".
3«3 Factors Affecting Risk Analysis
Several factors affect risk analysis. Some of these factors are the events 
(accidents or incidents) and their magnitude, affected parties, and impact zones or 
distances. The following subsections describe these factors individually.
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33.1 Events
Events can be categorized as a normal event, an accident, and an incident. 
A normal event refers to routine activities during normal operation. An accident 
refers to an unusual condition such as a collision, or an unexpected circumstance 
that may lead to a fatal or catastrophic result. An incident is an unusual event 
such as a tank rupture. Events can be classified based on the probability of their 
occurrence and their respective consequences (see Figure 3.2). Risk could be 
defined as the product of these two factors. Of particular concern would be those 
events with the highest potential risk (marked by x). Events with high 
probabilities and high consequences are ruled out as unacceptable because of 
their potential for catastrophe. Thus, the key characteristics of events with 
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Figure 3.2 Probability vs. Consequence
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consequence events. The degree of exposure to an event dictates the effect that is 
to be expected. Long term health effects may result from normal operation due 
to frequent exposure. In an accident condition, long-term but latent and 
immediate effects may be of concern. A  hazardous materials transportation 
accident is considered a low probability/high consequence event.
33.2 Probability of an Accident
The probability of an accident can be estimated as a function of accident 
frequency and accident type. Accident probability includes occurrence of an 
undesirable event (such as truck accident involving hazardous materials) and the 
conditional probability that this event will result in a release o f hazardous 
materials. Historical records show that the probability of a hazardous materials 
transportation accident is very low, (usually on the order of 1 x 10 * accidents/mile 
traveled (Kirchner and Rhyne, 1991), compared to the highway motor vehicle 
nonfatal accidents of 98.95 x 10 * per mile traveled in 1992 (USDOT BTS, 1994). 
A comparison between motor vehicle and hazardous materials trends in 
accidents/incidents from 1981-1992 is shown in Figure 3.3. Despite the low 
probability of a hazardous material transportation accident, the potential for a 
serious consequence, should an accident occur, is very high.
Current DOT guidelines express the probability of an accident as a 
function of accident rate per mile for all vehicle types and the length of the link 
being evaluated. The availability of hazardous materials truck accident data
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Figure 3.3 Trends in Accidents/Incidents by Transportation Mode: 1981-1992
(USDOT BTS, 1994)
redefines the equation for determining accident probability as follows (Russell and 
Harwood, 1993):
P { J ? )  ,■ = TAR; ^ P { R \ A ) i  y .L ,  (3-2)
where:
P(R)i = probability of an accident involving a hazardous materials
(HazM at) release for route segment i 
TARi — H azM at truck accident rate (accidents/veh-mi) for route
segment i
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P(R\A)i = probability of a HazM at release given an accident involving a 
truck carrying HazM at for route segment i 
L, = length (mi) of route segment i
Accident rates may be influenced by highway type, road condition 
(geometry, pavement surface, climate), driver’s capability, vehicle type, traffic 
conditions, time of day, containment design, distance traveled, frequency of 
shipment, and tonnage shipped. Driver’s capability is one factor that may be 
difficult to quantify because o f the high variability in human behavior between 
individuals and also for the same individual ovej time.
3 J.3  Probability of a Release
Given an accident involving a hazardous materials truck, the probability of 
a release may be computed as follows (Russell and Harwood, 1993):
/ ' ( / ? | A ) y  = ( / ? | / 1 )  * X f  (Xr) y (3.3)
k
where:
P{R\A)j = probability of a HazM at release given an
accident involving a HazMat-carrying vehicle 
for highway cMss j 
P(R\A)f. =  probability of a HazM at release given an
accident involving a HazMat-carrying vehicle 
for accident type k
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P(k)j = probability that an accident on highway class j
will be of accident type k
Traffic accidents and container failure (leak or spill) are the two major 
contributors to the expected consequence of a release (Glickman, 1991). In the 
case of radioactive materials transport, the risk resulting from an accident or an 
incident such as a breach may involve radiological and non-radiological 
consequence.
The type of material transported will be an important factor that 
determines whether there is a high or low probability of a release during an 
accident. O ther factors that affect the probability of a release are the type of 
packaging or container used to transport the materials, meteorology, and the 
operating speed.
33.4  Affected Parties
Risk is commonly evaluated based on consequence to affected parties 
which include the population, environment, property, and transportation system. 
The consequence to population is often measured in terms of population exposed. 
Some studies have also measured consequence in terms of health effects 
(Neuhauser and Kanipe, 1992; Yuan, et al., 1995). Population consequence can 
be a combination of various effects such as; health effects (radiation - normal and 
accident condition), fatalities (directly attributed to hazardous materials), injury 
(major and minor injuries), and permanent incapacitation.
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Raj and Glickman (1986), in their risk study involving chlorine and LPG, 
stated that in estimating consequence, "the population density factor should 
include on-scene professional (train crew, fire fighter and related emergency 
personnel). Furthermore, the degree to which persons in the lethal area are 
vulnerable (depending on their preparedness, mobility, protection and so forth) 
should be reflected."
33 .5  Impact Distance
The magnitude of a consequence depends in part on the extent of hazard 
or impact distance. Decisions on the impact distance to be used are affected by 
the type of material to be transported and meteorological conditions. Impact 
distances may vary from 0.40 km (0.25 mi) to more than 16 km (10 mi) depending 
on the material, severity of spill, and atmospheric conditions present at the time 
of the accident (Cheng, 1988). KSU uses a 0.80 km (0.50 mi) an effective impact 
distance while Portland considered 0.40 km (0.25) mi to be sufficient for first 
phase evacuation (Harwood and Russell, 1990). An effective impact distance 
could be equated to 8 km (5 mi) (Klein, 1991) on both sides of the road.
The weather conditions prevailing at the time of an event can significantly 
affect the extent of the impact area. W eather conditions include wind direction 
and speed, atmospheric stability, air temperature, rainfall, cloud cover, humidity, 
and visibility condition. Turner (1970) developed a model to estimate impact 
distances. This model is based on Gifford’s procedure which was a modification
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of Pasquill’s procedure. It determines the downwind and crosswind distances for 
various wind stability classes. Existing models, such as ALOHA (Areal Location 
of Hazardous Atmospheres), could be used to determine the impact area or the 
downwind impact distance needed to evaluate the affected population. ALOHA 
is also known as CAMEO (Computer-Aided M anagement o f Emergency 
Operations). This model is also based on Turner’s Workbook on Atmospheric 
Dispersion Estimates.
A nother method of evaluating impact distances for extremely hazardous 
substances, except for radioactive materials, is presented by EPA (1987). EPA 
calls the impact zone a Vulnerable Zone (VZ). EPA’s method estimates the 
radius of vulnerable zone for releases of gases, liquids, and solids using 
information on the type and quantity of materials released and on atmospheric 
conditions. The methodology is based on the following assumptions; i) flat 
terrain, no obstacles that would interfere with the downwind movement of the 
plumes; ii) ground level release; iii) F-stability class and 1.5 meters per second 
wind speed; and iv) continuous release. The substance is assumed to undergo no 
phase change and to be at ambient temperature; to be neutrally buoyant in air 
and to generate a plume with Gaussian distribution. O ther assumptions are that; 
gases are released over a 10-minute period; liquids are instantaneously spilled 
from containment onto a flat, level surface forming a 0.033 ft deep pool; solids in 
powder form behave like gases and are also released in 10 minutes; solids in 
solution are assumed to behave as a finely dispersed aerosol and are also released
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in 10 minutes; solids in molten form are assumed to behave as liquids and are 
also released in 10 minutes; and solids in brick form are not likely to be released.
An example analysis for the chemical, fluorine, is presented below. If 4600 
gallons of fluorine is released, the vulnerable zone (VZ) is estimated, using the 
EPA method, as follows:
Quantity Released (QS) = 4,600 gal x 8.3453 Ibs/gal = 38,388.38 lbs 
Rate of Release (QR) = QS/10 = 3,839 Ibs/min 
Level of Concentration (LOC) = 0.039, use 0.035 
Rural VZ = 4.3 mi (6.88 km)
Urban V Z = 1 . 3  mi (2.08 km)
Manual 10, A Guide to the Safe Handling of Hazardous Materials 
Accidents (ASTM, 1990) contain evacuation information on various types of 
hazardous materials. For radioactive materials in a very large cask, the American 
Society of Testing M aterials (ASTM) Safe Handling of Hazardous Materials 
Accidents suggests an evacuation zone of ,2500 feet (0.80 km) in all directions. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the initial evacuation distances for accidents involving 
radioactive materials (ASTM, 1990).
The 1993 Emergency Response Guidebook (USDOT, 1993) identified 
initial protective zones for various type of materials. Tliese zones are divided into 
the initial isolation zone as shown in Figure 3.4a and the protective action zone in 
Figure 3.4b. The protective action zone may be equated to the impact area.
While the Guide provides values for both zones, the values are approximative and
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Table 3.2 Evacuation Distances for Accidents Involving Radioactive Materials
Description Action
U nder 200 pounds keep 20 ft away (6 m)
Over 200 pounds evacuate to 500 feet (0.15 km)
Incapacitated guards evacuate to  1500 feet (0.46 km)
Very large cask evacuate to 2500 feet (0.76 km)
represent standardized conditions which may not reflect the actual conditions.
The population within the impact area accounts for the population 
exposed. When considering health effects, or effects in terms of doses, the 
distance from the event plays a major factor. A person closer to the event is
In itia l 
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Figure 3.4 Initial Isolation Distances for HazMat Accidents (USDOT, 1993)
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likely to receive more dose than a person who is located farther away from the 
event (USDOT, 1992).
Overall, risk analysis requires basic information on the transport mode, 
route characteristics, material transported, shipment characteristics, container and 
packaging characteristics, volume per container, number of trips, exposed 
population and environment, release mechanisms, meteorological data, 
topographical data, and dispersion method. A nother important aspect that 
significantly affects risk includes those which are considered to be "human factors" 
related.
3.4 Risk Assessment Techniques
Souleyrette and Sathisan (1994), Harwood and Russell (1990), Cheng 
(1988), Jenssen and Castleman (1984), and Rowe (1983) provide a detailed 
discussion on the risk assessment methods which include enumerative indices, 
regression models, network and distribution models, and probabilistic risk 
assessment models. Present practices identify risk assessment methods as those 
presented in Table 3.3. The table includes a listing of the methods of risk 
assessment and a brief description of each method. In this research, the 
Geographic Information System (GlS)-based method of probabilistic risk 
assessment is utilized.
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Table 3.3 Risk Assessment Methods
M ethods of Risk 
Assessment
Description
Statistical modeling most common technique; employs past historical data
Fault tree modeling logical process; uses deductive reasoning; places most 
important event at beginning of the tree and branching 
out to the possible causes of such an event
Simulation modeling mimics actual events; probabilities of risk assessed by 
various scenarios
Subjective estimation uses a panel of experts; employs judgement useful for 
initial estimation
Enumerative indices based on rating or scoring scheme; easy to use; lacks 
precision
GIS method new technique; facilitates detailed evaluation
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CHAPTER 4
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Emergency response preparedness is recognized as one way of minimizing 
the consequences of accidents after they occur and in minimizing community 
vulnerability (Rowe, 1983). Safety and protection of the public, property, 
environment and infrastructure are among the primary concerns related to the 
transport of hazardous wastes. The adverse consequence of an event involving 
hazardous materials can be prevented or minimized if an emergency response 
team can be at the site of the event immediately after an incident. The presence 
of an emergency response facility minimizes the consequence of an event in terms 
of attending to affected population, timely evacuation, containment of the event, 
and mitigation activities. The effectiveness of an emergency response unit 
depends heavily on response time or ability to respond immediately to an event, 
its capabilities and its resources. While emergency response is important, it is 
considered an optional factor in the FHWA hazardous materials routing and risk 
assessment methods and no specific procedures for its consideration are provided 
(Harwood and Russell, 1990).
36
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4.1 Definition of Emergency Preparedness
Emergency preparedness is defined as the acquisition and maintenance of 
trained personnel, resources, facilities, plans, and procedures, and is considered an 
integral component in the safe transport of hazardous materials. Emergency 
preparedness can be measured in terms of the ability to provide a timely and 
adequate response to an emergency should it occur at any given time. The ability 
to provide a timely response relies on the availability of a response unit and its 
proximity to the scene of an accident. Adequate response is dictated by the 
availability of personnel, personnel training, and availability of equipment. There 
are two elements of the response process: the initial response and the specialized 
response. Initial response is provided by first responders or those who are first to 
arrive on scene, such as the fire or police departments. Specialized response is 
provided by responders who are specially trained to respond to a particular type 
of an event. It is possible for the first responders to possess capabilities that 
enable them to provide specialized response as well.
Some of the basic questions relating to the evaluation of emergency 
preparedness of a locality include the following:
i) Who are the emergency responders and where are they located?
ii) How long would it take for first responders and qualified responders to 
arrive at the scene of an accident?
ii) What resources are available with the response units?
iii) Are the units adequately staffed? What types of training does
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the staff have?
The relationship between emergency response and risk is the potential 
minimization of the consequence, and thus risk, of an event such as an accident or 
an incident. While emergency preparedness and response is difficult to quantify, 
there is a need to quantify this so as to identify existing capabilities, needs and 
plans for deployment of additional resources. Factors to consider in this analysis 
include response time, availability of response units and the capability of available 
response units.
The purpose of this Chapter are: to evaluate the logistics involved in 
responding to an emergency involving a hazardous materials transportation 
accident; to evaluate the factors used to quantify emergency preparedness of an 
area and; to identify the factors needed to develop a methodology for assessing an 
emergency response factor.
4.2 Logistics of Emergency Response to Events
Upon notification of the event (i.e., accident/incident), the dispatcher 
determines the nature o f the event and dispatches the response unit that can 
reach the scene as quickly as possible. The response unit then travels to the scene 
and provides the necessary response to control the site. Based on information 
received, the response unit evaluates the severity of the accident, and calls for a 
backup or specialized team, if deemed necessary. Control zones are established to 
delineate areas of responder control. The control zones are divided into the hot
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zone, warm zone and cold zone as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The hot zone is the 
area immediately surrounding the hazard zone. This is also referred to as the 
exclusion or restricted zone. Access to this zone is limited to persons assigned to 
control the event. The warm zone is the area where personnel and equipment
S U P P O R T  ZONE
W in d  D ire c tio n
COMMAND 
















Figure 4.1 Diagram of Control Zones (Source: CCFD, 1995)
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decontamination takes place. The hot zone support is also maintained in the 
warm zone. It is also referred to as the decontamination, contamination 
reduction, or limited access zone. Cold zone is the area that contains the 
command post and other support functions. This is also referred to as the clean 
zone or support zone.
4.3 Response Time
Time is a critical factor in an emergency. The time it takes an emergency 
response unit to reach the scene of an event is important in terms of establishing 
control of the area and determining the nature of the hazard. The ability of the 
response unit to provide appropriate and timely response to an emergency will 
minimize or mitigate the consequence of an event. Response time is a primary 
consideration in deploying (locating) emergency response stations and individual 
units. A knowledge of the exact location of emergency response units would 
enable estimation of response time with respect to areas likely to be affected and 
would enable an effective deployment of emergency responders.
The deployment of an emergency response unit is typically based on 
proximity of the unit with respect to the scene of an accident or an incident. 
Normally, when an emergency call is received, the response unit which can reach 
the event in the shortest time is dispatched first.
Response time is defined as the time elapsed between identification of an 
event and the arrival of a response unit. It consists of the time elapsed between
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the occurrence of an accident and the call for a dispatch, time elapsed between 
the identification of an incident and the assignment of an emergency response 
unit, time to travel from the base location of the unit to the scene of the accident, 
and the actual time to provide response (Zografos, et al., 1994).
43.1 FHWA Response Window
The Federal Highway Administration (FHW A) HAZM AT routing guide 
uses a 10-minute response window as the basis for evaluating response times. The 
FHW A recommends that "States determine the number of properly trained and 
equipped firefighting units within a 10-minute response window from any point 
along the highway route under analysis to include consideration of the effects of 
emergency response capabilities on mitigating the consequences of hazardous 
materials incidents" (FHWA, 1994). The rate of release to air of the total 
quantity of gas or solid as a powder or in solution, is assumed to be the quantity 
released in a specified amount of time. The US EPA has utilized a value o f 10 
minutes for this time (US EPA, 1987).
4.4 Emergency Response Capability
Emergency responders are generally categorized into paid and volunteer 
units. Paid units are those whose main jobs are to protect a locality against 
emergencies and are usually financed and/or maintained by a local government. 
Such responders are ’paid’ employees. V olunteer units are those units that are
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served by responders on a voluntary basis. It is to be noted that volunteer units 
could take a longer time to mobilize upon notification of an accident. Typically, 
urbanized areas are often manned by paid units. These units are often better 
equipped and better trained than volunteer units. Emergency response capability 
may be measured in terms of staff availability, staff training, equipment, and 
materials availability. One method of quantifying the emergency response 
capability is outlined in the Department of Transportation’s Guidelines for 
Selecting Preferred Highway Routes for Highway Route Controlled Quantity 
Shipments of Radioactive M aterials (USDOT, 1992). The guideline used a 
scaling method to measure response capability.
Staff availability. Ideally, a buddy system is implemented in deploying an 
emergency response team. The response team to a hazardous materials accident 
would consist o f an entry team, a back-up team, a decontamination team, and a 
support team (which could be a medical team, depending on the severity of the 
condition). This sums up to a minimum of eight staff and four vehicles for a 
single response.
The team size depends upon the severity of the event and the degree of 
response required. Sacarello (1993) specifies a 2-person team for Levels D and C 
response, a 3-4 person team for Level B, and a minimum of 5 persons for Level A 
response. Level A refers to the highest hazard requiring the highest level of 
equipment requirement, and Level D refers to the lowest hazard. In Sacramento, 
CA, initial dispatch for a hazardous materials incident consists of the following:
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Level I - One engine company (first responder).
Level II - One engine company, one Hazardous M aterials Response 
Team (HMRT), one Battalion Chief (BC), one investigator.
Level I to Level II upgrade (engine already on scene) - One HMRT, one 
BC, one investigator.
Upgrade of Level II to Level III (Level II response is already on scene) - 
One additional HMRT, one De-con team, one additional BC
In Clark County, Nevada, the minimum team size comprises one engine, 
one rescue team, and one battalion chief (CCFD, 1995).
Staff training. The Code of Federal Regulation, 29 CFR Part 1910.120 
specifies the level of training required for each emergency responder and the type 
of personal protective equipment required for various levels of response. The 
training consists of a first responder awareness level, first responder operations 
level, hazardous materials technician level, and hazardous material specialist level. 
The following is a brief description of each training level (Tokle, 1992):
1. First responders at the awareness level are those persons who, in the
course of their normal duties, may be the first on the scene of an 
emergency involving hazardous materials. First responders at the 
awareness level are expected to recognize the presence of hazardous 
materials, protect themselves, call for trained personnel, and secure 
the area.
2. First responders at the operations level are those persons who respond
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to releases or potential releases of hazardous materials as part of 
the initial response to the incident for the purpose of protecting 
nearby persons, the environment, or property from the effects of the 
release. They shall be trained to respond in a defensive fashion to 
control the release from a safe distance and keep it from spreading.
3. Hazardous materials technicians are those persons who respond to
releases or potential releases of hazardous materials for the purpose 
of controlling the release. Hazardous materials technicians are 
expected to use specialized chemical protective clothing and 
specialized control equipment.
4. Hazardous materials specialists are those individuals who respond with
and provide support to hazardous materials technicians. Their 
duties parallel those of hazardous materials technicians but their 
duties also require a more directed or specific knowledge of the 
various substances they may be called upon to sustain. Hazardous 
materials specialists are expected to use specialized chemical 
protective clothing and specialized control equipment.
Personal Protective Equipment fPPEV The type of PPE required varies 
with the required levels of response. PPE is the equipment provided to shield or 
isolate a person from chemical, physical and thermal hazards that may be 
encountered at a hazardous materials incident. It includes both personal 
protective clothing and respiratory protection (Tokle, 1992). Appendix B of 29
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CFR Part 1910.20 specifies the PPE requirement for various levels of response 
and ranges from Level A to Level D. Level A corresponds to the highest level of 
protection and Level D, to the lowest level of protection. Level A is selected 
when the greatest level of skin, respiratory and eye protection is required. Level 
B is selected when the highest level of protection is necessary but a lesser level of 
skin protection is needed. Level C is selected when the concentrations and types 
of airborne substances are known and the criteria for using air purifying 
respirators are met. Level D is a work uniform affording minimal protection, and 
is used for nuisance contamination only (Tokle, 1992). Table 4.1 summarizes the 
type of equipment and protection provided for various levels of protection. It also 
specifies when particular equipment should be used.
General Control Equipm ent. General control equipment availability is 
measured in terms of the availability of equipment for use in responding to 
emergencies that involve hazardous materials. These include first aid and other 
medical equipment, emergency vehicles available for hazardous materials 
response, sampling equipment, analytical equipment, and fire fighting equipment 
(NRT, 1987). General control equipment could also be grouped into detectors, 
emergency manuals, firefighting equipment, foam equipment, plugs and patches, 
and supplies and tools (Holmes and Byers, 1990). The general control equipment 
required for various levels of response have also been specified in the literature. 
Hancock, et al. (1993) categorized the capability requirement into 5 levels. They 
identified the number of personnel, personnel training and equipment
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requirement for each class of hazardous materials for each level as shown in 
Table 4.2.
4.5 Required Level of Response
The US National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) categorize hazardous 
materials incident (HMI) into 3 levels: HMI Level I, HMI Level II, and HMI Level 
111. The level of response required increases with an increase in HMI level. Table 4.3 
summarizes the planning guide for each HMI level.
The NFPA 704 (NFPA, 1990) characterizes hazards as health, flanimability, 
reactivity or special hazards. Health, flammability, and reactivity hazards are each 
assigned numerical ratings of 0 to 4. The hazard evaluation required to determine the 
correct rating for a specific material is left to the judgment of a person or persons who 
are technically competent and experienced in the interpretation of the hazard criteria. 
Only the health hazard is described in detail as shown in Table 4.4. Other hazards are 
beyond the scope of this research.
In assigning ratings for the required level of response, information from Table
4.3 and Table 4.4 may be useful.
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Table 4.4 Degrees of Hazard (NFPA, 1990)
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Description o f  Hazardous Materials PPE Required D egrees
o f
Hazard
M aterials that, on very short exposure, could 
cause death or major injury, including those 
that are too  dangerous to  be approached  
without special protective equipment.
Norm al protective clothing and 
breathing apparatus available to  
the average fire departm ent will 
not provide adequate protection  
against inhalation or skin contact 
with these materials.
4
M aterials that, on short exposure, could cause 
serious temporary or residual injury, including 
those requiring protection from all bodily 
contact.
Full protective clothing, including 
SC BA , coat, pants, gloves, boots, 
and bands around legs, arms, and  
waist should be provided.
3
M aterials that, on intense or short exposure, 
could cause temporary incapacitation or 
possible, residual injury, including those  
requiring the use o f  respiratory protective 
equipm ent that has an independent air supply.
Full-faced mask SCBA that 
provides eye protection.
2
M aterials that, on short exposure, could cause 
irritation, but only m inor residual injury, 
including those requiring the use o f  approved  
air-purifying respirator.
SC BA  desirable 1
M aterials that on short exposure under fire 
conditions, w ould offer no  hazard beyond that 
o f  ordinary combustible materials.
N o hazard 0
SC B A  - Sclt C ontained Breathing Apparatus
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CHAPTER 5
METHOD OF ANALYSIS AND DATA REQUIREMENTS
The selection of preliminary route alternatives for hazardous materials 
transportation is often based on travel time, travel distance, road type, and 
population. These are some of the routing criteria adopted in various existing 
models such as HIGHW AY (Johnson, et al., 1992). O ther models consider risk 
and emergency preparedness. Risk elements include population, environment and 
infrastructure. While the latter two subjects are significant, this study addresses 
only the potential risk to  population. Emergency preparedness, which is often 
measured qualitatively, is quantified. The quantitative measure is integrated into 
the risk analysis process. The methodology is thus intended to facilitate 
comparative risk assessment.
The risk to population may be categorized as long term risk and immediate 
risk. Long term risk deals with the long term health effects arising from frequent 
exposure to hazardous materials during normal conditions and/or a one time 
exposure to radioactive releases during an accident. Immediate risk deals with the 
immediate effects to population during an accident or an incident involving 
hazardous materials. Only immediate risk to population is addressed in this 
research.
58
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
5.1 Quantifying Risk
As previously stated, risk can be defined as a function of the probability of 
occurrence of an event, the probability of a release, and the value of its 
consequence. Consequence could be the affected population or population 
exposed, property damage or the affected environment. Common risk assessment 
techniques address these three factors individually or in pairs. Considering 
population alone, risk could be expressed as:
R isk  I \  A cc) X I \  Re] | A cc)  X PopExp (5-1)
where:
P(Acc) = probability of accident
P(Rel\Acc) = conditional probability of a release given the
occurrence of an accident
PopExp = exposed population
The type of materials involved in an accident affects the magnitude of risk 
(e.g. nonflammable materials may be less risky than the highly explosive or 
radioactive materials). In comparative risk assessment for identifying alternative
routes, the effect of type of hazardous material can be ignored, since the objective
is to evaluate alternative routes for a specific commodity to be transported.
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5.2 Assumptions
The following assumptions were used to develop a methodology to support 
comparative risk assessment;
1. The material is transported using the highway system.
2. The type of material or its quantity and packaging system do not change
for all routes and for all route segments. These affect the probability 
of a release and its consequence. But when dealing with only one 
type of material, the probability of release with respect to the type of
material in question is the same along the entire route. The quantity
and packaging are kept constant so as to have the same consequence 
across routes.
3. Only the immediate risk is considered. Long term and latent health
effects are not considered.
4. Normal weather prevails.
5. The response units have equal communication capability.
6. All response units originate from their base station.
5.3 Effect of Distance on Risk
The effects of hazardous materials accidents vary with distance from the 
source of the event and the physical and chemical properties of the material 
involved in the event. Previous studies address this effect by establishing the 
impact area and assuming that the effect is uniformly distributed across the
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impact area. In reality, the population or environment closer to the source of an 
event is likely to experience more severe consequence than those further from it. 
As the distance from the event increases, the consequence of such an event 
decreases as shown in Figure 5.1 due to dispersion effects. Thus, the assumption 
of uniform distribution across the impact area may not correctly represent actual 
conditions and may lead to  a misrepresentation of risk. The impact area is also 
affected by the direction of wind. In most cases, greater impacts are felt in the 
downwind direction, which could extend to several miles from the location of an 










Figure 5.1 Dispersion Isopleths (Source: DOT/RSPA, 1992)
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exposed. When considering health effects, or effects in terms of doses, the 
distance from the event plays a major factor. A person within Isopleth I is likely 
to receive a greater dose than a person at Isopleths 2, and 3 (US DOT, 1992).
The isopleths are lines of constant atmospheric concentration. The distance factor 
is significant in evaluating doses and health effects to population and is influenced 
by the type of material and atmospheric condition. In this study , the distance 
factor is not addressed.
5.4 Effect of Emergency Response
Risk and emergency response, although recognized as being important, are 
always regarded as two separate issues. Risk is heightened in an area with no 
emergency response facility than in an area where the emergency response facility 
is immediately available. This research focuses on risk minimization due to the 
presence of an emergency response facility. Risk is minimized by minimizing 
consequence due to the presence of an emergency response facility. Figure 5.2 
illustrates the effect emergency response on risk. Unfortunately, existing risk 
models do not reflect this issue explicitly. For a specified event, the conceptual 
relationship between risk, population, and emergency response facility is 
illustrated in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3. Risk, Population and Emergency Response
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The effectiveness of an emergency response unit can be measured in terms 
of response time and the capability of the response unit. Response time is 
normally measured from the location of the closest responder to the location of 
an event. Considering this, a new value of risk can be estimated as a product of 
emergency response factor and relative risk. The new value of risk is termed 
effective risk in this study. Quantitatively, it may be expressed as follows:
Risk I = [3 ■ X Risk ,■ (5-2)
where:
Riskj = effective value of risk to reflect emergency preparedness for 
segment i
B, — emergency response factor for segment i 
The emergency response factor, 6, may depend on response time, the 
number of response units available within a given response time, and the 
capability of an emergency response unit. Chapter 6 discusses in detail the 
procedure for estimating the 6 factor.
5.5 Effective Risk
Probabilistic risk estimate is based on the probability of an accident, 
probability of a release, and population exposure. The objective of risk analysis is 
to estimate the relative risks among alternative routes, and choose the route that
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minimizes risk. Traditional risk assessment methods do not address the effect of 
emergency response. In this research, emergency response is introduced as a 
factor affecting the risk estimate and combined to the original risk equation to 
obtain the final risk estimate. The objective is to compare risks among alternative 
routes with consideration to emergency preparedness along the route and 
compare the relative risk among alternative routes.
The importance of emergency preparedness in the estimates of risk is 
illustrated using Figure 5.4. There are three potential paths from the origin O to 
destination D: Route 0-1-2-4-D, Route 0-1-4-D, and Route 0-1-3-4-D. Each 
segment i has an associated initial probabilistic risk (R J value and an emergency 
response factor (BetaJ. The total risk for any route based on the traditional risk 
analysis techniques could be estimated as the sum of the risks along individual 




TotRisk ~  sum of all segment risks along the route
Riski =  effective value of risk to reflect emergency
preparedness for segment i 
n = number of segment along the route
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Thus, for the three paths shown in Figure 5.4, the total risks are designated 
as initial risk. Based on initial risk alone, the path with minimum risk is Path O- 
1-3-4-D and is ranked #1 , or the most preferable. Path 0-1-2-4-D has the 
maximum risk, and is ranked #3 , or the least preferable.
[ R U E R l ]
[10 , 1]
|R 7 .  E R 7]
[ 10, 1]
P a t h
In itia l
T o tR isk R a n k B e to R a n k
M o d ified  R isk , 
B e ta  * T o tR isk
N ew
R a n k
0 - 1 - 2 - 4 - D 5 0 2 0 .9 5 2 4 7 1
0 - 1 - 4 - D 6 0 3 1 .0 0 1 6 0 2
0 - 1 - 3 - 4 - D 4 0 1 1 .8 5 3 7 4 3
A â 9 u m «  l e n g th s  o f  in d iv id u a l s e g m e n t s  =  1
Figure 5.4 Risk with Emergency Preparedness
The third column provides the emergency response factor (ER). In terms 
of emergency preparedness. Path 0-1-4-D  has the lowest Beta or the most 
prepared, and is ranked #1. Paths 0-1-2-4-D and 0-1-3-4-D are ranked # 2  and 
#3 , respectively. Considering emergency preparedness, the effective risk, which 
is referred to as modified risk in Figure 5.4, is computed using Equation 5-2.
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With the introduction of an emergency preparedness factor, Path O -1-3-4- 
D, which was initially ranked #1, was dropped to rank #3  and Path 0-1-2-4-D 
which was initially ranked # 2  remained second among the three paths.
In cases where only the route characteristics and number of shipments vary, 
a normalized effective risk may be useful in evaluating alternative routes. The 
normalized effective risk along the route may be expressed as:
AveRisk




AveRisk = normalized effective risk for route of distance L
n = number of segments along route i
/, = length of segment i
L = total length of route




The database needed to support risk and emergency preparedness analyses 
may be divided into four data categories, namely:
i. network




iv. emergency response 
The database is a very essential part of the analytical process. The 
reliability of the analytical procedures and results are heavily dependent on the 
accuracy and completeness of the data. Some of the problems likely to be 
encountered in performing the analysis rest mainly on data acquisition and data 
accuracy. In the absence of required data, surrogate data may be used. The 
following subsections provide a description of the data categories.
Network. Important network attributes include node information, 
coordinate and spatial relationship in a transportation network, link distance, 
position and direction of link, link capacity, number of lanes, one or two way 
street, functional classification, travel speed, beginning and ending milepost of 
individual link. The network data are incorporated into a GIS environment to 
support the methodology proposed in this research.
Population. Consequence data may be the population data, sensitive or 
special population, environment, infrastructure and other measures of 
consequence. For this study, only the population data is of concern. While this 
study addresses only the resident population, other population groups such as 
non-resident and special populations may be added to the analyses, especially if 
temporal variation is considered. The Bureau of the Census is a source for 
resident population data. This data set is also incorporated into a GIS
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environment. Under the population group, the area to be used for the affected 
population is dictated by the material involved in an accident, the atmospheric 
conditions, and the direction and speed of prevailing wind.
Probability. Probability data comprise the probability of an accident and 
probability of a release involving an accident. The probability of an accident 
could be derived from accident rates along the routes of interest. Accident rates, 
measured in terms of accidents per vehicle kilometer travelled, require both 
accident and traffic data.
D ata on the probability of a release given an accident may be obtained 
from truck accidents involving hazardous materials and reports on whether or not 
the materials are released.
i. Accident data. Data on truck accidents involving hazardous materials
along the routes of interest make up the accident data. Current data 
reporting systems make this difficult to obtain. In the absence of this 
data set, local data on total truck accidents or all vehicle accidents 
may be used.
ii. Traffic data. The vehicle kilometers travelled may be obtained from 
traffic data on trucks canying hazardous materials. Truck traffic may 
be used in the absence of these data. In certain areas where no truck 
counters exist, the truck average daily traffic is often estimated as a 
percentage of the annual average daily traffic involving all vehicles.
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iii. Shipment data. The quantity and type of hazardous materials 
shipments may be obtained from commodity reports.
Emergency Response. This consists of information on the locations and 
capabilities of emergency response facilities such as type of response services, 
personnel availability and training, available response and personal protective 
equipment, and communications capabilities of individual response units. The 
data on the location of emergency responders and the network will facilitate 
response time analysis in evaluating the time a response unit takes to travel from 
its base location to the scene of an accident.
The success of using the proposed methodology will rely on the availability 
and accuracy of the data. The most critical portion of data preparation involves 
estimation of population within the impact area and preparation and analysis of 
variables for emergency response factor. The procedure of estimating population 
is described in Chapter 7 and Appendix A by way of an example. Chapter 6 is 
devoted to describing the method of estimating emergency response factor.
5.7 Analytical Tool
It is the intent of this study to develop a methodology that will support the 
analyses of hazardous materials transportation routes during the planning and 
operational stages. An analytical tool is in turn selected to perform the 
methodology. A Geographic Information System (GIS) was the environment
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chosen to develop the analytical tool to be used to evaluate relative risk and 
emergency preparedness along hazardous materials transportation routes. A GIS 
is a computerized system which facilitates the capture, management, analysis and 
display of spatial data. The GIS environment is chosen because of its ability to 
maintain large databases, flexibility to maintain data in accordance with the user’s 
needs, and performing operations to support spatial analyses.
In developing the methodology, the following criteria were applied:
1) data input are kept to a minimum
2) database is easily updated and modified
3) results are easy to interpret and analyze
The GIS program ARC/INFO (version 7.0.2) was used to facilitate 
database management and maintenance, various analytical works, and presentation 
of graphic results. Network analysis, dynamic segmentation, and arcplot modules 
and INFO in ARC/INFO were used extensively. A detailed description of 
ARC/INFO applications and analytical procedures used for this study is presented 
in Section 7 and Appendix A.
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CHAPTER 6 
DETERMINING B FACTOR
An emergency response factor is introduced in an effort to quantify the 
effects of emergency preparedness near the vicinity of an event. Since emergency 
preparedness is a function of travel time, the number of response units available 
within a 10-minute response window, and the capability of the response units, 
these are the factors that need to be used to quantify the effects of emergency 
preparedness. Thus, three indices were introduced to estimate 6: travel time 
index, response unit index, and station response capability index. The 6 factor is 
assumed to vary with individual route segment.
6.1 Travel Time Index
Response time has been defined in Chapter 4 as the time elapsed between 
identification of an event and the arrival of a response unit, and the time elapsed 
between the identification of an event and the actual time to provide response. In 
this research, the former definition is used. This could be expressed as:
R T  = 7 T +  TD  + T T  (6-1)
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where;
R T  = response time
TC — time elapsed between the occurrence of an event and the call
for a dispatch
TD = time elapsed between the call for a dispatch and the
assignment of an emergency response unit 
TT  = time to travel from the base location of the unit to the scene
of an event
The time elapsed between the occurrence of an event and a call for a 
dispatch, TC, is site specific and therefore, highly variable and difficult to model. 
The time elapsed between the call for a dispatch and the assignment of an 
emergency response unit, TD, is based on a dispatcher’s capability and may be 
considered constant. Due to the high variability of TC, only the travel time is 
used to  evaluate response time.
The variable used to evaluate the effects of time is termed travel time 
index (TTI). TTI is estimated as a fraction of the FHW A response window and 
the time it takes a response unit to travel from the station to the scene of an 
event. For a route segment i, it is expressed numerically as:
777, = ^  (6-2)
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where :
TTI, = travel time index along segment i
TTi = travel time from station to segment i, minute
For most conditions, the most critical situation is when:
0 < TTI I < 1
Figure 6.1 shows the relationship between response time and travel time 
index. The relationship shows that the quicker the response, the greater is the 
value of TTI.
R éponse Time, minutes
Figure 6.1 Travel Time Index vs. Response Time
6.1.1 Travel Time Analysis
Travel time is the time taken by an emergency response unit to travel from 
the base station to the scene of an event. Travel time is measured as a function 
of distance and the vehicle’s travel speed.
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A responder’s travel time at various points along the network is important 
in evaluating emergency preparedness. The use of ARC/INFO network analysis 
module is one of the methods of evaluating travel times from a fixed origin to a 
specified destination. For a response unit, the origin is assumed to be the base 
station. Network analysis is discussed in detail in Appendix A.
Travel time contours, isochrones, can be developed to determine the 
farthest point a response unit can reach in a specified time along the routes, 
assuming each point is a potential scene of an accident or an incident. From the 
result of the analysis, it is possible to determine the station nearest (in terms of 
travel time) to the scene of an event. It is also possible to approximate the travel 
times of individual stations from the base station to the farthest point of the 
network. The network analysis could also be used to evaluate segments of the 
routes that could not be reached within a specified travel time.
6.2 Response Unit Index
The availability of response units within close proximity minimizes the 
consequences of an event in terms of providing timely and appropriate response 
actions to an event. The presence of more than one unit could help in identifying 
the most capable first responder, in possibly enhancing the response effectiveness 
(particularly for tasks that can be conducted in parallel rather than sequentially), 
and in minimizing perceived risk in terms of increased public confidence. While 
the presence of more than one unit may improve the ability to respond to an
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event, the effect may not be directly proportional (e.g., two response units may 
not decrease risk by a factor of two). The term Response Unit Index, RUI, is 
introduced to better quantify this impact. It is expected that as the number of 
response units available increases, the rate of increase of the RUI value will 
decrease. This effect is evaluated in this section. The actual response time taken 
to complete initial action during a hazardous materials incident is used as a 
measure. The actual response time is a function of the time required to complete 
individual tasks and the nature of performing the tasks (either in sequence or in 
parallel).
6.2.1 Actions Taken During an Emergency
The number of response units and manpower support contribute to a 
successful response operation in terms of timely response to an event. In most 
situations, while responding to a hazardous materials incident (HM I), "there are 
never enough team members to accomplish all the tasks that need to be 
completed" (CCFD, 1995). A successful operation depends on timely rotation of 
Hazardous Materials Response Team (HM RT) members and use of outside 
manpower to fill in non-specialized positions. Availability of additional units 
could help reduce the time required to complete a response action to an event. 
Response to  an event generally comprises identifying number of units available, 
determining tasks to be completed, working on tasks, and completing the tasks 
(see Figure 6.2).
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— >  I d e n t i f y  u n i t s  a v a i l a b l e
i
Determine task (s) to  be completed
Work on task(s)
1
  Response Complete?
Yes
D i s p e r s e  u n i t s
Figure 6.2. Response Actions to an Event
Assuming an event requiring M tasks with time t̂  for individual task i, the 
total response time T  for a single unit to respond to an event is the sum of the 






T  = total time required for a single unit to complete an action 
consisting of M tasks 
t, = time required to perform task i 
If N units were available, the total response time, can be quantified as
follows:
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M
2 : '  //
where:
7\, = total time required for N units to complete an action
consisting of M tasks 
This assumes that all tasks need to be completed in a sequential manner. 
However, the response actions may include some tasks which could be conducted 
simultaneously. In such cases, the total response time would be less than the sum 
of all the response times for individual tasks. For this purpose, it would be useful 
to differentiate tasks in the following manner. An individual task may be 
categorized as a serial or a parallel task. A serial task is one that must be 
performed singly (not in conjunction with any other task); and a parallel task is 
one that can be performed simultaneously with one or more other tasks. These 
need to be evaluated in terms of the number of response units available. 
Specifically, the two key scenarios are one where only one unit is available and 
the second where multiple units are available.
6.2.2 Single Unit
A  single unit for a Level I HMI normally consists of one battalion chief, 
one engine company and one paramedic unit. With a single unit, there may not 
be adequate manpower and capability to perform the tasks in as little time as
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possible. Figure 6.3 shows the initial action taken by a first responder when 
responding to a hazardous materials incident. For a single unit, tasks must be 
done consecutively due to unavailability of manpower as illustrated in Figure 6.3a. 
The action starts with:
i) identifying the material
ii) determining the incident level
iii) requesting a HM RT if it is a Level II incident
iv) assigning base location
v) isolating the scene
vi) establishing the hazard zone (limited access zone) 
vii) identifying the immediate hazards
viii) initiating containment techniques within the capability of the unit 
ix) determining personnel protection requirements 
x) evaluating the need for evacuation
xi) initiating procedure to remove civilians from immediate areas
xii) containing the incident or event 
xiii) rescuing the injured, and
xiv) developing some intervention strategy
It is essential to identify serial tasks as they are likely to affect total 
response time. The total response time may now be evaluated as the sum of the 
response times on the "critical path". A critical path is a path through the 
network wherein activities could not be performed unless the preceding activity
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Figure 6.3. Initial Actions by First Responder Prior to Arrival of HM RT
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has been completed, and for which the sum of the response times is the greatest. 
The total response time may be redefined as:
T u = j : t . c ,  (6-4)
/  -1
where:
Cj = 1  for task i if it is on the critical path (Cp)
(V i I task i e Cp); 0 otherwise
6.23  Multiple Units
The presence of additional units may greatly reduce response time in terms 
of providing support or performing parallel tasks. For example, if three units 
arrive at the site, some tasks could be performed by Unit 1, other tasks could be 
performed by Unit 2, and yet others by Unit 3 as illustrated in the example shown 
in Figure 6.3b. This may result into branching or performance of different tasks 
at the same time, thus resulting in significant time savings, or lesser value of total 
time as illustrated in Figure 6.4. Figure 6.4 further illustrates how parallel tasks 
can be performed by three response units. Numbers 1 to 12 in Figure 6.4 
represent the decision points indicative of the start or finish of individual tasks, 
while letters A to M represent the activity name, and tl-1 represents the time it 
takes Unit 1 to complete activity 1, t2-l represents the time it takes Unit 1 to 
complete activity 2, and so on. While task A, B, C are consecutive and critical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
- > . E -
E






Figure 6.4. Serial and Parallel Tasks by Response Units
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tasks which must be performed by a single unit (Unit 1 in the figure), the 
remaining tasks can be distributed among the three responding units in order to 
minimize total response time. If tasks A, B and C are along the critical path that 
could be performed by one or more than one unit, and D to M are additional 
tasks performed by other units, total response time can be expressed as:
k





t, = time required to perform task i
Sj = 1 V i I task i e s (set of serial tasks); 0 otherwise
tj = time required for unit j to perform tasks m
Sjj = 1 V  i I task i e s (set of serial tasks for unit j);
0 otherwise
In Figure 6.4, the total time would be the time to complete tasks A, B, and 
C, plus the maximum of the sum of times taken to complete tasks D, E, H and K 
by Unit 2, task L by Unit 3, and tasks F, G, I, J, and M by Unit 1.
The number of response units is more significant in responding to a Level 
II HMI than a Level I HMI, where several response teams may be required to 
perform various tasks as illustrated in Figure 6.5. Normally, dispatch for a Level









Figure 6.5. H M R T Action Upon Arrivai at Incident Site - Level II HMI
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II HM I consists of one engine company, one HM RT and any support vehicle, one 
paramedic unit, and one battalion chief.
Initially, RUI is assumed to be a function of total time to complete all 
activities, T, which is in turn a function o f multiple response units, N. The 
relationship between the total time to complete all activities and the num ber of 
response units is evaluated using various possibilities such as shown in Figure 6.6. 
Some of the possibilities include assuming T  as an inverse function of N, as a 
power of N, and as a logarithmic function of N. Variables b and c shown in 
Figure 6.6 are constants or parameters.
10.0
9.0









Number of response unit, N
Figure 6.6 Hypothetical relationship between T  and N
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In cooperation with the Clark County Fire Departm ent Training Center, an 
exercise was performed to simulate the effects of multiple units. A  detailed 
description of the exercise is presented in Appendix D. Using the data obtained 
from the exercise, a regression analysis was performed to establish the relationship 
between the time to complete the initial response actions, 7%,, and the number of 
response units, N. The relationship between the time to complete the initial 




= total time for N response units to perform all activities 
k, b = constants (function of type o f event and material)
The resulting relationship has a correlation coefficient, R \  of 0.92 and is 
expressed as follows:
(6-8)
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It should be noted that the exercise involved only five units and thus served 
as the basis of the relationship. Based on Equation 6-8, 7]̂  was estimated for 
various values of N. For N = 1 to N = 5, the estimated values of 7%, decreases 
from 6.94 minutes to 3 minutes (see Figure 6.7).
The data obtained from the exercise were limited and while they do reflect 
the trend suggested by Equation 6-8, it is believed that the expected "yield point” 
(where the curve flattens out) has not been attained. In reality, the total time to 
complete an activity can be reduced to only so much, and the presence of 
additional units would no longer be significant.
In the absence of actual data on the minimum total time to complete initial 
actions, lower bound values, r„„„, of 3.0, 2.5, and 2.0 minutes were evaluated. 
These were assumed to be the minimum total time during which all initial 
activities can be performed. Any further increase in the number of response units 
will not lead to any significant reduction in total response time. Figure 6.8 
illustrates the results. For T,,,,,, = 3.0 minutes, the effective maximum number of 
response units corresponds to 5, for = 2.5 minutes, the effective maximum 
number of response units corresponds to 7, and for 7„„„ = 2.0 minutes, the 
effective maximum number of response units, corresponds to 11.
It is to be noted that the critical lower bound value, 7'„,„„ will be a function 
of a number of factors including the nature and severity of the event, the material 
being transported, on-link and off-link characteristics proximate to the location of 
the event, and meteorological conditions.
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A term T  is introduced to account for the "yield point", and redefine the 
total time to complete the activities. Thus, Equations 6-8 and 6-9 can be 
reiterated as follows:
r = m a x ( T ^ ,  ) (6-10)
where:
T  = total time to complete the initial response activities
= critical lower bound value of total time to complete the 
initial response activities 
Based on the total time to complete initial response activities, RUI is 
determined as:
R U I  (6-11)
 ̂1
where:
T, -  total time for a single unit to perform all activities 
The equation shows that the presence of one unit leads to RUI value of 
1.0 which indicates no effect on the overall risk estimate. However, the presence 
of more than one unit lead to RUI values of less than 1.0. It will reach a point 
where an increase in the number of response unit is not going to be significant. 
Figure 6.9 shows the variation of RUI with N.
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For segment i along the route:
R U I. -- ^  (6-12)
^ 1
where:
RUI- = response unit index along segment i 
7] = total time for response unit(s) to perform all activities
along segment i
The preceding discussion emphasizes the importance of the number of 
response units, N. But in remote areas where the response units could not 
respond immediately, the effectiveness of multiple units diminishes. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume effects of the number of response units is maximized within 
the 10-minute response window. Outside 10-minutes, it is assumed that the 
materials would have already been dispersed, or the impact would have already 
been experienced, therefore, the number of response units would no longer play a 
major role.
Therefore,
i f  7 T > 1 0 ,  then N ^ \
6 3  Assignment of Ratings
Station response capability is evaluated in terms of the capability rating of 
individual unit. This is taken as the average normalized weight of the following
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factors: staff availability, staff training, and equipment availability. Equipment 
availability includes availability of personal protective equipment, and availability 
of general control equipment to contain hazardous materials.
One method of evaluating individual factors is through a rating scheme.
This method is used in this research. A numerical rating is assigned to personnel, 
personnel training, personal protective equipment, and general control equipment. 
In general, a rating of 0 to 5 is used, where 0 corresponds to the lowest and 4 or 
5, to the highest rating. The rating is based on the discussions in Chapter 4, and 
aims to establish a basis for measuring the capability of the individual unit. This 
rating also serves as the basis for identifying the levels of response required for 
accidents involving various types of hazardous materials.
The rating scheme adopted in this research was used for illustrative 
purposes only. Individual users may wish to evaluate alternate rating schemes that 
better suit their needs. However, once the rating scheme has been adopted, it 
could be used in the methodology presented in this research.
6.3.1 Personnel Availability Rating (PER)
Table 6.1 shows the level of response, the minimum personnel required, 
and the PER rating. A PER rating of I to 4 is assigned for various response 
levels as shown in Table 6.1. A rating of I is assigned to the lowest level, and a 
rating of 4 to the highest level. This indicates that the greater the number of
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Table 6.1. Personnel Level Availability Rating (FER)
Level Personnel Available PER
Lxivel D 3-6 1
Level C 4-6 2
Level H 6-7 3
l^ v e l A 8 or more 4
persons available, the better is the ability to respond to an event. Therefore, the higher PER  
values reflect better ability to respond.
63.2 Personnel Training (PT)
Table 6.2 shows the level of training, type of training, and the PT rating for 
various levels of training. A PT rating of 0 is assigned to the lowest level of 
training (awareness level) and a rating of 4 for the highest level of training 
(specialist level). The higher the level of personnel training, the better is the 
ability to respond. Therefore, the higher PT values reflect better ability to 
respond.
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Table 6.2. Personnel Training Rating (PT)
Level o f  Training Type o f  Training FL
N o training N one 0
Level I Awa rencss 1
Level II Operations 2
Level III Technician 3
Level IV Specialist 4
6 J .3  Personal Protective Equipment Rating (PPE)
Table 6.3 shows the PPE category, level of protection required, and the 
PPE rating for various levels of protection. A PPE rating is applied for each 
category with the lowest protection level being assigned a rating of 1 and the 
highest protection level, a rating of 4. The higher the level of PPE, the better is 
the ability to respond. Therefore, the higher PPE values reflect better ability to 
respond.
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Table 6.3 Personal Protective Equipment Rating (PPE)
Category Protection Level PPE
I^vel D work uniform, lowest protection 1
Ix'vcl C 2
Ix!vcl IJ 3
I.evel A highest protection 4
63.4  General Control Equipment Rating (EQT)
Table 6.4 shows the category of general control equipment, the response 
equipment required, and the equipment rating. General control equipment may 
be grouped into 5 categories and assigned a rating of 1 to 5. An EQT rating of 1 
is assigned to the lowest response level and a rating of 5 to the highest response 
level. The higher the response equipment category, the better is the ability to 
respond. Therefore, the higher EQ T values reflect better ability to respond.
Each of the capability factor should satisfy the required level of response to an 
event.
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Table 6.4 Response Equipment Rating (EQT)
Category R esponse Equipment EQ T
Ixjvel 1 minimum requirem ent, MMI I 1
Ixjvcl 2 HM I I to  II 2
Lxvcl 3 HM I II 3
Ix v e l 4 HM I II to  III 4
Ix;vel 5 HMI III 5
6.4 Station Response Capability
Station response capability measures the capability of a response station 
based on personnel availability, personnel training, general control equipment, and 
personal protective equipment. These capabilities need to be evaluated with 
respect to the desired or required capabilities. Mathematically, station response 
capability of a single station j could be expressed as:
PBR. FI'. 
SRCj ~ ^
E Q T PPE.V  i + w. -)








response capability rating of station j along segment i 
personnel availability rating of station j along segment i 
team level required
personnel training rating of station j along segment i 
personnel training required
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EQTj = equipment availability rating of station j along segment i
E L R  = equipment level required
PPEj = PPE rating of station j along segment i
PPR  = personal protection required
Wj = weight for personnel availability
w, = weight for personnel training
w, = weight for equipment availability
= weight for personal protective equipment
rv,, ŵ , rvj, «̂ 4 > 0
t W 2 + rvj + --- 1
Weights, w, to w ,̂ are introduced to account for variation in the relative 
importance of each factor. Weights may be assigned by a group of experts or 
decision-makers based on their perceived relative importance of individual factors.
Station response capability is evaluated to ensure that the capability of an 
individual station is identified. The information provided will be veiy useful in 
selecting a unit that will match or exceed the required level of response. An SRC 
greater than unity indicates better preparation than required, SRC equal to unity 
indicates preparation just equal to what is required, and SRC less than unity 
indicates less preparation than required.
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6.5 Response Capability Index
The response capability index measures the capability of available response 
units along a route of segment of interest and is taken as a function of station 
response capability. For transport segment i with a single station, the response 
capability index, /?C, could be expressed as:
RC- = SRC; (6-14)
where:
RCi — response capability index along segment i
For a specific transport segment i with multiple stations, RC could be expressed 
as:
/-/■,. "iÊ fo r .  > y,j:P P E , (6_15)
R C  . - 1  C-LLl .   , - X i J --------  . ■.. /■•-J--------)
'  N  PLR E fR  ELR PPR
subject to:
N >  0
But this will tend to average out the capabilities of multiple units. It does 
not take into consideration the fact that RC will be at least as good as that of the 
best unit if it were the only station for the link.
Therefore, another method of evaluating RC would be by taking all 
personnel available, and combining it with the best personnel training, best
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protection, and best equipment available among all responding units. RC could 
then be expressed as:
'Z  PBK,. ) (m ax  /iC ?7 -.. ) (max P P E ..) (6-16)
 g L R  P P R ~
For purposes o f this research study. Equation 6-16 is used because of its 
simplicity and ease of implementation.
6.6 Required Level of Response
As mentioned in the previous section, the required level of response is 
based on the health hazard posed to the exposed population. There are 5 degrees 
of health hazard, as characterized by NFPA, with 0 and 4 being the lowest and 
highest hazards respectively. A hazard level may be assigned for various types of 
materials. It is to be noted that materials that fall under the same HazM at 
classification may not have the same hazard level. Evaluation of individual 
material is outside the scope of this study. Instead, only the Class 7, radioactive 
materials have been considered for subsequent analysis.
6.6.1 Team Level Requirement (TLR)
Hancock, et al. (1994) assigned a team level requirement for accidents 
involving various classes of hazardous materials. The team level is assigned a 
rating of 1 to 4, where 4 corresponds to the lowest level and 1, to the highest
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level. Class 2 poisonous gases are assigned the highest level of 1. O ther classes 
of hazardous materials are assigned team levels of between 2 to 4. Class 7, 
radioactive materials, was assigned a team level o f 4.
In this study, a team level rating of 1 corresponds to the lowest level, while 
a team level rating of 4, to the highest level. Using the rating scheme used in this 
study, Hancock, e t al.’s (1994) rating of 4 (lowest level) for radioactive materials 
would correspond to a rating of 1 (lowest level). It can be noted that the team 
level of 1 for radioactive materials appeared to be under rated. To maintain 
consistency with this study’s rating scheme, Hancock, et al.’s rating scheme is 
modified so that level 1 corresponds to the lowest and level 4 corresponds to the 
highest. Further, the required team level rating for a radioactive materials 
accident is reassigned a level of 4.
The required level of response for accidents involving various types of 
hazardous materials should be met by the responding units. The available 
personnel within a given shift should be able to satisfy the number of personnel 
requirements for various levels of response. For a level 4 team responding to a 
radioactive accident/incident, the highest level of personnel training required is 
that of a specialist level, or a training level rating of 4.
Responders responding to a radioactive material accident may use a 
personal protective equipment of level B, which corresponds to a rating of 2. This 
comprised a Structural Firefighting Protective Clothing (SFPC) with SCBA. The
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general control equipment should be of level 5 response capability, with a rating 
of 5.
In summary, the levels of preparation required for an accident involving 
radioactive materials are:
TLR = 4; PTR = 4; ELR = 5; PPR =  2 
These values may be substituted in Equation 6-13 to  reflect the capability 
rating based on radioactive material type of emergency. For a single unit, the 
resulting equation is as follows:
a w : ^  * .17 )y > 4 : 4 ' 5 " 2
6.7 EfTective Response Index
The effective response index, ERI, along segment i represents the 
combined effects of the two variables, travel time, 7T;, and response capabilities, 
RCj. This can be evaluated as:
E R I,. = T T I , X RC, (6-18)
where:
ERi = effective response index along segment i
TTj = travel time index along segment i
RCj — response capability index along segment i
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The relationship reflects the inverse effect of travel time, and the direct 
effect of response capability to emergency preparedness. An increase in travel 
time indicates a need to improve emergency preparedness. An increase in the 
response capability is an indication of an improved emergency preparedness. A 
high effective response index may indicate that a response unit is present within 
close proximity, and this unit is adequately equipped and manned by trained 
personnel, and vice versa for a low effective response index.
6.8 Emergency Response Factor, B
The 6 factor can be expressed as a function of travel time, response 
capability, and the number of response units within the area of interest. For a 
route segment i, it is expressed as:
P, » ^  (6-19)
subject to 6 >  0 
By substitution from Equation 6-17:
A  value of 6 greater than unity indicates poor or lack of emergency 
response or preparedness, 13 equal to unity indicates the presence of a single 
response station with the capability just about equal to what is required, and B 
less than unity indicates better emergency preparedness.
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For the entire route of length L, B factor can be estimated as follows:
f  R U I, ^  ,
1
where:
6l = emergency response factor for the entire route L 
/, = length of segment i 
L  = length of route
In doing comparative evaluation of two or more routes, the values of 6 
along the individual route segments, as well as along the entire route may be 
useful. An example shown in Figure 6.10 illustrates their importance. When 
considering the entire route. Route A (B =  1.7) appears to have inferior overall 
emergency response preparedness than Route A (B = 1.5), despite the fact that 
Route A  is longer than Route B. But at the segment level, the most critical 
segment is at Route B (6 = 3.0).
In comparative route analysis, the objective would be to minimize total risk 
for the entire shipment. This would suggest that the route with the lower 6 
(Route B) would be the preferred route even though it is longer. However, if the 
route were examined at a microscopic level, i.e., a t the link level, the B̂ and B/lj 
values provide an indication of absolute risk and relative risk at the link level. In 
such a case, as is illustrated in the example, the route with the lov/er cumulative 
risk had links that had the "worst" link. Specifically, the first link on Route B had
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Figure 6.10 Route Comparison Using Emergency Response 
a unit value of B of 0.075. This is the highest among all links in either Route A 
or Route B. If Route B is indeed chosen, then the total risk could be further 
reduced by targeting such links with "poor risk profile" for enhancement of their 
risk profile.
The implications of the analysis presented here are that the methodology 
could be used not only for comparative risk analysis, but also for understanding 
issues pertaining to equity and distribution of risk.
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CHAPTER 7
CASE STUDY
A case study was performed to test the application o f the methodology 
developed in the research. Its purpose was to evaluate the risks along potential 
routes for the transportation of HLRW  and SNF to the proposed geologic 
repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Three routes in Clark County, Nevada 
were chosen for this case study. These routes include 1-15, US-95 and US-93.
The case study aims to illustrate the effects of emergency preparedness on risk 
estimates. The study is based on the following limitations and/or simplifying 
assumptions:
i) Temporal traffic variation is not considered
ii) The county’s road network is on a level terrain (grade = 0 percent)
iii) Travel speed is uniform in each functional road classification, and is
taken equal to the posted speed limit to account for traffic variation
iv) All response units have equal communication capability and originate 
from the station.
The GIS software package ARC/INFO (version 7.0.2) was used to support 
the analyses. Technical discussions of GIS applications used in this study are 
presented in Appendix A.
106
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7.1 Background
Yucca Mountain, Nevada is being studied as the only site for permanent 
disposal of HLRW  and SNF. M aterials coming from nuclear power plants and 
D O E facilities across the United States could be shipped to the proposed 
repository. If the site at Yucca Mountain is found suitable, many states and 
counties which will serve as transportation corridors will be impacted. Depending 
on the frequency and size of shipments, the impacts associated with these 
shipments can vary tremendously. Clark County, Nevada is one of the counties 
that are likely to be affected by a decision to site the geologic repository at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada.
7.1.1 Site Description
Clark County, Nevada is located southeast of Nye County, site o f the 
proposed Yucca Mountain geologic repository (see Figure 7.1). It is the most 
populated county in Nevada. Yucca Mountain is located about 90 miles 
northwest of Las Vegas, a metropolitan area in Clark County. Clark County 
include other major cities such as North Las Vegas, Henderson, and Boulder City. 
This county depends heavily on tourism which is a vital part of Nevada’s economy. 
In the past year, more than 30 million visitors visited Las Vegas. It is projected 
that this number will continue to grow.
Clark County is one of the counties likely to be impacted if the proposed 
repository is built in Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Impacts related to socio-
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Figure 7.1 Study Area: Clark County, Nevada
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economics, cultural, transportation and other activities, are likely to be 
experienced by the county. Transportation impact is the main focus of this study.
7.1.2 Routes of Interest
Currently, the State of Nevada is evaluating several potential highway and 
rail routes that may be candidates for transporting radioactive materials to Yucca 
Mountain. Some of these routes pass through Clark County (see Figure 7.1).
For the highway mode, the State of Nevada has several alternate route options 
which allow radioactive materials to be transported from both the northern and 
southern parts of the state. One option uses US-93 with entry at Wendover, 
Nevada from the northeast, continues southbound to SR-318, enters Clark County 
via US-93 and continues to US-95 westbound onto Yucca Mountain. Another 
option uses northbound 1-15 from California to Clark County and continues to 
SR-160 onto Yucca Mountain. Another option uses southbound 1-15 with entry 
from Mesquite and continues to US-95 westbound onto Yucca Mountain. Thus, 
routes 1-15, US-95, and US-93 are selected for this case study (see Figure 7.2).
7.2 Data
The data are maintained in a GIS environment, using the ARC/INFO 
software package. All the coverages are based on the UTM (metric) projection 
system. The data are grouped into five categories, namely: network, fire station, 
population, accident, and traffic.
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Network. The Clark County street centerline file was obtained from Clark 
County Geographic Information System M anagement Office (GISMO). The 
coverage was originally in state plane coordinate and was transformed to 
Universal Transverse M ercator (UTM) system in order to be consistent with other 
data. An attribute, travel time, is added to the INFO table to define the 
approximate operating speeds along the road network. Speeds along the network 
have been assigned on the network using speeds of 88 kph (55 mph) on U.S. 
roads and interstate highways, 72 kph (45) mph on major arterials, and 48 kph (30 
mph) on other roads. The speeds did not consider time of day effects (delays due 
to traffic). These speeds were based on the speeds that govern the Clark County 
fire units prior to the passage of new legislation by the U.S. Congress which led to 
an increase in the posted speed limit on the road network in late 1995.
Fire Station. The first responders to an accident could be a unit from one 
of several organizations - fire, police, highway patrol, or ambulance. However, for 
simplicity and to illustrate the analysis, initial response to a hazardous material 
transportation incident is assumed to be provided by fire stations. A coverage 
containing the locations of stations maintained by the Las Vegas and Clark 
County Fire Departm ents was obtained from GISMO. Locations of additional 
stations which did not appear on the original database were added manually using 
the Clark County street centerline file as a background coverage. The points were 
plotted based on the information provided by the State of Nevada Fire Marshal 
Division. Updated information (attributes) related to station capability was
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obtained by calling the individual fire department. Data pertaining to all fire 
stations in Clark County were collected and presented in Appendix C. The data 
include the station name and location, number of personnel, personnel training, 
and equipment. These data were used to assess the capability of responders.
Population. The 1990 Bureau of the Census population data were used in 
the analysis. Figure 7.3 shows the block level population distribution in Clark 
County, Nevada. An enlarged section showing the block level population in Las 
Vegas Valley is presented in Figure 7.4. Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show the population 
density distribution in Clark County and Las Vegas Valley, respectively. It should 
be noted that over the last five years, there has been a tremendous growth in the 
population of Nevada, specifically, in Clark County. This population change has 
not been accounted for in this analysis primarily due to difficulties in obtaining 
the same. Visitors were not considered in the analysis, although they make up a 
significant volume, especially in Clark County.
Accident. Truck accident data were extracted from the accident files of 
Nevada Departm ent of Transportation (NDOT). This data set contains all types 
of recorded accidents along NDOT maintained roads. Truck accident data were 
selected from these files and later used in the analysis. Historical distribution of 
accidents on 1-15, US-95, and US-93 from 1987 to 1993 are presented in 
Appendix B. Figure 7.7 shows the historical accident distribution along the routes 
of interest.
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Figure 7.3 Block Level Population Distribution In Clark County
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Figure 7.4 Block Level Population Distribution in the Las Vegas Valley
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Figure 7.5 Block Level Population Density Distribution in Clark County
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Figure 7.6 Block Level Population Density Distribution in the Las Vegas Valley
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Figure 7.7 Historical Accident Distribution Along Routes of Interest
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Traffic. Average daily traffic (ADT) volumes are used to estimate the 
vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT) along a particular segment of the route or 
routes. The 1989 to 1993 traffic data along 1-15, US-95, and US-93 were obtained 
from the NDOT. From the NDOT reports, truck ADTs are taken as a 
percentage of the annual ADTs of all vehicle types. Appendix B shows the 
historical variation of truck ADTs on the major routes.
7 3  Initial Risk Analysis
As stated in Chapters 2 and 3, risk is typically based on the probability of 
an accident, probability of a release given an accident, and consequence. This 
section describes the method used to evaluate these factors.
73.1 Probability of an Accident
7.3.1.1 Truck Vehicle-Kilometers Traveled (TVKT)
The truck average daily traffic were estimated using the annual average 
daily traffic (AADT) and the percentage of truck travel data obtained from 
NDOT. The truck vehicle-kilometers traveled were estimated as a product of 
truck AADT and the length traversed. This is expressed as follows:
T A D i;  = %Truck x  A A D i;' (7-1)
TV M '^ = TAD Ti x / y  X 365 (7-2)
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where:
TADTj = truck average daily traffic along segment i
%Tnickj -  percentage of truck traffic along segment i
AADTj = annual average daily truck traffic along segment i 
/, = length of segment i, km
TVMTj = annual vehicle miles of truck travel along segment i
The historical variations of TVMT  along routes US-93, US-95, and 1-15 are 
shown in Appendix B.
7.3.1.2 Truck Accidents
Only the truck accident data were used to estimate the probability of an 
accident. Five-year truck (1989-1993) accident data were obtained from the 
Nevada Departm ent of Transportation (NDOT). The data were extracted from 
the accident records of all vehicle types. These data do not contain information 
on whether or not the accidents involve hazardous materials. Additional data 
were requested from the USDOT Office of Hazardous Materials. While the 
USDOT data identify the type and quantity of hazardous materials involved in an 
accident, these data do not specify the exact location of these accidents. In the 
absence of this information, the NDOT data were used in the analysis. Accident 
frequencies were estimated on the segments defined from the TAD T  distribution. 
For each year, the number of accidents recorded in each segment are summed up.
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7.3.1.3 Accident Rates
For each segment, the truck accident rates per vehicle kilometer of travel 
were estimated using the following equation:
where:
AccRate, = truck accident rate along segment i 
TAcCi -  annual total truck accidents along segment i
By combining equations 7-2 and 7-3, the accident rate is estimated as follows:
AccR>,,e , .
The distribution of accident rates along the major routes of interest is 
presented in Figure 7.8. For each segment, the maximum of accident rates from 
1989 to 1993 were used to estimate the probability of an accident (representing a 
worst case scenario) which is estimated as follows:
P  ( A cc) j - AccRate  ,• x / y  (7-5)
73.2 Probability of a Release
The probability of a release given an accident may be estimated using 
Equation 3-3 suggested by Harwood and Russell (1993). The US DOT Federal 
Highway Administration motor carrier accident data can be used to estimate the 
probability of a release given an accident.
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Figure 7.8 Accident Rate Distribution Along Routes of Interest
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Nevada does not have a record of radioactive materials incidents involving 
a release. Hazardous materials accident data do not specify the exact location of 
an accident but only the name of the street where it occurred. Therefore, it is 
assumed that individual segments on each route has equal probability (100 
percent) of a release should an accident occur. This, once again, represents an 
upperbound (worst case) scenario.
7.33 Consequence Estimate
Only the population consequence is addressed in this research study. The 
population consequence refers to the population exposed within the impact area. 
This section describes the population data used in the analysis and the method of 
estimating the population exposure.
7.3.3.1 Population Exposed Within the Impact A rea
The Bureau of Census collects population data every 10 years. The latest 
period for which the data were collected was in 1990. The population is grouped 
into various geographical census groupings: county, tract, and block. The 1990 
block population data were used in this study.
The population distribution in Clark County is highly stratified and 
densifies towards the Las Vegas metropolitan area. Estimation of the population 
density distribution along the route is divided into two steps which include:
i) Block level estimation of population density
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ii) Dynamic segmentation based on population density 
The population density along the routes was analyzed using the block level 
data to ensure that the variation in the population distribution is correctly 
represented. The population density distribution was evaluated in a GIS 
environment. The routes were divided into links to reflect the variation in 
density.
7.3.3.2 Population Estimation
Figure 7.9 illustrates the procedure for estimating the population within the 
buffer area. A route (1) is buffered to define the impact area (2). The buffered 
route is overlayed on the block population coverage (3). As can be noted in (3), 
blocks B l, B2, B3, and B4 were within the buffered area. The population and 
areas of the respective blocks were used to estimate the density, assuming that the 
density is uniform within the block. Since only portions of blocks Bl and B3 are 
within the buffered area, the population of these blocks are reestimated in 
proportion to the area that lies within the buffer (4). Individual routes were 
divided into segments based on population density distribution. A segment is 
defined along a route segment with relatively uniform population density. A new 
segment was assigned to the next route segment whenever there was a significant 
change in population density.
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PopDetij = population density in block j
Popj = population in block j
Aj = area in block j
The block density ensures that the population within the block is uniformly 
distributed. This is significant because ARC/INFO retains the external attributes 
of a coverage even if changes that affect the attributes have been made. An 
example is the population attribute. When one block with a population of 50 is
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bisected (e.g., when defining an impact area), the resulting two subblocks will 
retain an attribute of 50 population each, which is misleading. Bisected blocks 
should not be mistaken as two blocks having the same population. Similarly, the 
density of the undivided polygon is carried over as an attribute to each of the 
polygons created when the original polygon is divided into two parts: one within 
the buffer and the other outside the buffer. Therefore, the population within the 
polygon that lies inside the buffer can be estimated as the product of the area of 
this polygon and the original population density. The population density along an 
individual segment is estimated by summing up the block population within the 
impact area of the segment and distributed over the impact area of the segment. 
This assumes that the population is uniformly distributed along the segment. 
Mathematically, it is expressed as follows:
PopDen  ̂ (7-7)
where:
PopDerii = population density for segment i
Popjj = population of block j along segment i
Aij = area of block j along segment i
m = number of blocks along segment i
Figure 7.10 shows the distribution of population along the routes of 
interest.
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Figure 7.10 Population Distribution Along Routes of Interest
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73,4  Probabilistic Risk Estimates
The initial risk estimate is based on the probability of an accident, the 
probability of a release, and population consequence. Only the population 
consequence is addressed in this research effort. In Nevada, available data on 
hazardous materials incidents do not specify the exact location of an accident, but 
only the name of the street where it occurred. A simplifying assumption was 
made by assigning equal probability of a release along the entire segments of the 
routes o f interest. This was done solely because appropriate data were 
unavailable. This represents the upperbound for the probability of a release.
Thus, initial risk was estimated as:
R isk j /* ( A cc  ) / X PopExp ; (7-8)
For each route, the variations of initial risk with individual segments are 
shown in Figures 7.11 to 7.13. The figures include the distributions of accident 
rates and population along the routes. As can be noted, the estimated values of 
initial risk vary from lO * to 10 ̂ . Segments of 1-15 near the intersection of US-95 
show higher values of initial risk (in the order of 10 ̂ ) compared to other portions 
o f the routes. The southern portion of US-95 and northern portion of 1-15 have 
initial risk values of around 10“*. The southern portion of 1-15 and northern 
portion of US-93 have initial risk values of around 10 ̂ . A major portion of the 
routes of interest have initial risk values of 10 ^ For 1-15, the critical segments lie 
between Milepost (MP) 37 (kilometer post 60) to MP 50 (kilometer post 80). For
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Figure 7.11 Accident, Population and Initial Risk Distribution Along I-l 5
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Figure 7.12 Accident, Population, and Initial Risk Distribution Along US-95
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Figure 7.13 Accident, Population and Initial Risk Distribution Along US-93
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US-95, the critical segments lie somewhere between MP 87 (kilometer post 140) 
to MP 90 (kilometer post 145). Segments from MP 0 to MP 31 (kilometer post 
50) have significant but variable risks. For US-93, only the segment between MP 
9 (Kilometer post 15) to MP 12 (Kilometer post 20) has significant risk.
7.4 Emergency Preparedness Analysis
Emergency preparedness along the route corridors was evaluated using 
response time, number of available emergency response units, and capability of 
emergency response units as evaluation measures. These measures are quantified 
into a single measure called the emergency response factor. The procedure 
involves the following:
i) Evaluation of individual response unit
ii) Response time analysis
iii) Evaluation of number of available response unit
iv) Link-based analysis of emergency preparedness 
A description of the individual processes follows.
7.4.1 Locations of Fire Stations
In this study, initial response to a hazardous material transportation 
accident is assumed to be provided by fire stations. Clark County has volunteer 
and paid units, with most units being categorized as the latter. Volunteer units, as 
the name suggests, are units staffed by people who serve on a voluntary basis.
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Paid units are those units regularly maintained by a local government agency to 
protect the people and environment against fire and other emergencies. Paid 
units are usually better equipped, have better capability than volunteer units, and 
are staffed by personnel who are regularly trained. Paid units are normally 
assigned by shifts and are immediately available when called to respond to an 
event. Therefore, a paid unit will usually be able to respond to an event faster 
than a volunteer unit. A penalty factor may be applied to account for the time 
lost when assembling the volunteers. In this study, only the paid units are 
considered. The presence of volunteer units was not addressed, and therefore, 
penalties were not introduced.
Figure 7.14 shows the locations of paid fire stations in Clark County with 
respect to the four routes of interest. The figure shows that fire stations, 
especially in the Las Vegas Valley area, are strategically located to ensure that the 
areas within the departm ent’s jurisdiction are covered by at least one responder. 
While the service areas of individual response units are clearly defined, response 
is not limited to these areas. The departments within the county have mutual aid 
understanding whereby the closest unit responds to an event regardless of whether 
or not it has jurisdiction over the area.
7.4.2 Capabilities of Responders
The capabilities of individual station were evaluated using the following 
factors: personnel availability, personnel training, personal protective equipment,




Figure 7.14 Locations of Initial Responders; Clark County Fire Stations
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and general control equipment. While communication system may be used as 
another evaluation factor, this research assumes that all units have equal 
communication capabilities.
Personnel rating (PER) is based on the number of response personnel on 
duty per shift, and whether or not the unit has a hazardous materials response 
team. In Clark County, only two stations, Station 24 (Clark County Fire 
D epartm ent) and Station 3 (Las Vegas Fire Department) have hazardous 
materials response teams. The locations of these stations are shown in 
Figure 7.15.
Rating for personnel training (PT) is based on the type of training 
undertaken by individual members of a response unit. A rating of one (1) to four 
(4), is assigned to represent various levels of training. The awareness level is 
assigned the lowest rating of (1) and the specialist level, the highest rating of four 
(4). No training is assigned the lowest rating of zero (0). Rating for personal 
protective equipment (PPE) is based on PPE availability for various levels of 
response as previously mentioned. In the absence of actual PPE data, a rating of 
2 is assumed, where a PPE rating of 1 is assigned to Level D and a rating of 4 to 
Level A. PPE 2 refers to a SFPC or turnout gear with SCBA worn by firefighters.
G eneral control equipment (EQT) is rated by evaluating the availability of 
five equipment types, namely; hazardous materials detectors, emergency response 
kits, foam system, patch and plugs/supplies and tools, and firefighting equipment. 
Each type is assigned a rating of one (1) for a total of response equipment rating






Figure 7.15 Clark County HazMat Response Teams
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of five (5).
The data pertaining to individual fire units are presented in Appendix C. 
Based on these data, the capability ratings for individual units were estimated and 
are presented in Table 7.1. These ratings were used in the subsequent analysis.
7.43 Importance Weighting and Response Level Required
A survey method was used to assign weights to the four capability factors. 
Fire chiefs from Clark County, Las Vegas, Henderson, North Las Vegas, and 
Boulder City Fire Departments were asked to assign weights based on the degree 
of importance that they assign to each category. The sum of the weights are not 
to exceed 100 percent. The results are summarized in Table 7.2. Two responders 
rate all four factors as equally important, while one responder rates both 
personnel and equipment as equally important but more important than training 
and PPE. The availability of personnel is rated as the least important by at least 
three of the responders. On average, equipment slightly edged training on the 
importance rating. PPE is rated third most important and personnel the least 
important. The result emphasizes the importance of training in emergency 
response. The average weights were used in the analysis. These correspond to: 
w, = 0.19, w, = 0.28, W3 - 0.29, and ŵ  = 0.24
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25 5 30 16.66 25 10 19
Personnel
Training
25 20 20 50 25 30 28
Equipment 25 50 30 16.66 25 30 29
PPE 25 25 20 16.66 25 30 24
Total too 100 100 100 100 100 100
Both high level wastes and spent nuclear fuels can be classified as Class 7, 
radioactive materials. Depending on the quantity of the materials involved in an 
accident, the response level may range from Level 1 to Level 4. The worst condition, 
an incident level of 3 requiring maximum response, the levels of response required 
for various categories may be as follows:
TLR -  4, PTR = 4, ELR = 5, PPR = 2
These values were used to evaluate the response capability of an individual
unit. The station response capability factor of individual stations are determined by
Equation 6-9 and summarized in Figure 7.16. As expected, Clark County Fire 
D epartm ent Station 24 (Station ID = 14) and Las Vegas Fire Departm ent 3 (Station 
ID  = 24) have the highest SRC factors.
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7.4.4 Travel Time Analysis
In this analysis, travel time is taken as the time to travel from the location 
of an emergency response unit to the scene of an event. The distance traversed 
by an emergency response unit within a given travel time is measured using 
network analysis module o f ARC/INFO. A detailed discussion on network 
analysis is presented in Appendix A. The distances traversed from individual 
stations to various points along the routes were evaluated individually using travel 
times of 5, 10, and 45 minutes. As mentioned, FHW A recommends a 10-minute 
response window for hazardous material incidents. Additional travel times of 5 
and 45 minutes were used for illustrative purposes. The results were used to 
assign the travel time index (TTI) along the routes of interest.
An example of the network allocation process is illustrated for a single 
unit. Station 3 was allocated to the network for travel times 5, 10, and 45 minutes 
as shown in Figure 7.17. The farthest distance traversed within a given travel time 
was used to define the boundary of area that could be served by Station 3. The 
resulting service areas are shown in Figure 7.18.
The network traversed by all units for travel times o f 5, 10, and 45 minutes 
is shown in Figure 7.19. An enlarged section showing the traversed network of 
the Las Vegas Valley is presented in Figure 7.20. Figure 7.19 shows that major 
portions of the routes can be reached in 45 minutes. Segments that cannot be 
reached are those that lie farther from the metropolitan area. In
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Figure 7.17 Network Allocation for a Single Unit
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r
Figure 7.18 Evaluation of Service A rea for a Single Unit
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Figure 7.19 Network Allocation of Fire Units for 5, 10 and 45 M inutes Travel
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Figure 7.20 Network Allocation o f Fire Units for 5, 10 and 45 M inutes Travel
Time: Enlarged Section of Las Vegas Valley
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
146
Figure 7.20, it can be noted that the entire Las Vegas metropolitan area can be 
reached within a 10-minute travel time. Figure 7.21 shows the travel time contour 
and population of the Las Vegas Valley. Areas with population greater than 2500 
could be reached by a responder within 5 minutes, and a major portion of the 
area with population less than 2500 could be reached within 5-10 minutes.
For all routes of interest. Figure 7.22 shows the portion of routes that 
could be reached in 5, 10, and 45 minutes. Table 7.3 summarizes the percentage 
of routes that could be served within various ranges of response times. Around 
19 percent of US-93 could be served within 5 minutes, and 18 percent of 1-15 
could be served within the same response time. For US-95, around 42 percent of 
the route could be served within 5 minutes. Considering the FHWA 
recommendation, only around 25 percent of routes US-93 and 1-15 are within the 
10-minute response window. For US-95, about 50 percent of the route is within 
10-minute response window. For travel times greater than 10 minutes but less 
than 45 minutes, around 52 percent of US-93, 36 percent of US-95, and 46 
percent of 1-15 would be covered. At travel times greater than 45 minutes, 1-15 
has the largest percentage (29 percent) of route that could not be covered, 
followed by US-93 (23 percent). Only 13 percent of route US-95 could not be 
serviced within 45 minutes.
7.4.5 Number of Units for Various Ranges of Travel Times
Table 7.4 summarizes the percentages of routes with number of response
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Figure 7.21 Travel Time Contours of Fire Units and Population Distribution in 
Las Vegas Valley
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Figure 7.22 Route Segments With Travel Times of 5, 10 and 45 Minutes
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units. Initially, a survey was conducted to determine if the number of response 
units has any effect in responding to an event. Among the six departm ent chiefs 
surveyed, four stressed that for a single event, two units is better than one, three 
units better than two, and so on. Two respondents indicated that the number of 
response units is incident-specific. A simulation was performed to evaluate the 
effects of multiple response units (see Chapter 6 and Appendix D). The result 
shows that multiple response units tend to reduce the total time it takes to 
complete initial response activities. The effects of multiple response units are 
measured by response unit index. The distribution of response units along the 
routes have been evaluated. Some areas could be served by more than one 
response unit. When the response travel time is increased to 45, most of the 
areas could be serviced by more than one response unit. While the 45 minute 
response travel time covers most of the area, response travel times less than 10 
minutes are favored, especially in highly populated areas. Table 7.4 shows the 
percentage of routes covered by N units for travel times of 5 and 10 minutes. The 
percentage of routes covered by N units for 45-minute travel time is not presented 
because outside the 10-minute response window, it is assumed that the number of 
response units will not affect the effectiveness of emergency response. For US-95 
and 1-15, more than one unit can provide response within 5-minute travel time. 
The num ber of units that could respond within 5 to 10-minute travel time is 
decreased. Based on the distribution of response units, the Response Unit Index 
(RU I) was assigned along the routes of interest.
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7.4.6 Variation of Emergency Response Factor
Figure 7.23 shows the relationship between emergency response factor, B, 
and population density where B is based on Equation 6-16. The trend shows a 
decrease in B with an increase in population density and vice versa. The B factor 
varies from 0.22 to 4.5, where 4.5 represents an area with no emergency 
responders within 45-minute travel time. This indicates that areas with high 
population are better equipped and have more emergency response units than 
areas with small population.
The maximum and minimum B along 1-15, US-95 and US-93 are shown in 
Figure 7.24. The lowest emergency response factor (B = 0.22), which corresponds 
to favorable emergency response, is found along 1-15 and US-95. Segments with 
low B are within the Las Vegas Valley and lie between kilometer post 40 to 85 for 
1-15 and kilometer post 90 to 150 for US-95. US-93 has a higher minimum B of
0.87. This implies that for US-93, the segment with the best emergency response 
is inferior to the best segments of 1-15 and US-95 in terms of emergency 
preparedness.
The normalized B along 1-15, US-95 and US-93 are also shown in Figure 
7.24 and varies from 2.7 to 3.1. The nonnalized 6 represents B along the entire 
route and is estimated using Equation 6-21. As can be noted, route US-93 has 
the highest value of normalized B. The high values of normalized B indicate that 
major segments of route US-93 does not have adequate emergency preparedness.
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Figure 7.24 Maximum, Minimum and Normalized Beta Along Routes
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7.5 Risk Estimates Including Emergency Preparedness
The quantitative effect of emergency preparedness is introduced in the 
probabilistic risk analysis. The effective risk, which takes into consideration 
emergency preparedness, is estimated using Equation 5-2. The effective risk 
estimates are compared with those of initial risks. The results are shown in 
Figures 7.25 to 7.27 for 1-15, US-95, and US-93, respectively.
In terms of emergency response, critical segments of 1-15 are from 
kilometer posts 0 to 40 (MR 0 to 25) and from kilometer posts 90 to 140 (MR 56 
to 87) as reflected by high values of 6 . High 6 indicates the absence of emergency 
responder within the 45-minute travel time. Segments of the 1-15 route from 
kilometer posts 40 to 85 (MR 25 to 53) are better prepared to respond to 
emergencies as reflected by low values of 6 . Low 6 indicates the presence of 
capable and/or more than one emergency responder.
For US-95, segments representing kilometer posts 30 to 80 (MR 18 to 50) 
and kilometer posts 160 to 200 (MR 100 to 125) are critical segments as reflected 
by high values of 6 . These segments do not have emergency response units within 
45-minute travel time. The segment of the route which lies between kilometer 
posts 80 to 150 (MR 50 to 94) have better preparedness than the rest of the route 
segments as reflected by low values of 6 . Within this segment, however, is about 
5 kilometer stretch, between kilometer posts 125 to 130 (MR 78 to 81), which also 
seemed to be lacking in emergency preparedness. For US-93, only the segments 
from kilometer posts 7 to 19 (MR 4 to 12) are better prepared to respond to
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Figure 7.25 Beta and Risk Distribution Along 1-15
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emergencies. The remainder of the route either has no emergency responder 
within the 45-minute travel time, or has less capable emergency responders.
In areas where initial emergency responders are present, the effective risk 
is lower than the initial risk. Conversely, effective risk is increased in areas with 
no emergency responders. Table 7.5 provides a comparative analysis of initial and 
effective risk estimates using a ranking scheme. The segments were ranked based 
on criticality. The highest rank (No. 1) is assigned to the most critical segment.








1-15 KM 50-55 2500 0.50 2 4
KM 60-80 10,000-25,000 0.25-0.70 1 1
KM 140-145 <1000 2-4.5 3 2
KM 198 2000 2 4 3
US-95 KM 0-50 <100 2-4.5 2 1
KM 140-145 5,000 - 90,000 0.45-0.60 1 2
US-93 KM 15-20 500-2,800 0.87 1 1
KM 100-130 < 100 2-4.5 2 2
For 1-15, route segment from kilometer post 60 to 80 (MP 37 to 50), which 
has the highest population, is the most critical (Ranked No. 1) in the initial risk 
analysis. The same segment remains critical (Ranked No. 1) in the effective risk
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analysis although the value of effective risk is less than the initial risk due to the 
presence of emergency responders. The route segment from kilometer post 140 
to 145 (MP 88 to 91) is ranked No. 3 in the initial risk analysis. This segment was 
ranked No. 2 in the effective risk analysis. The area surrounding this segment 
has second highest population. By performing an effective risk analysis, it was 
shown that this area is not prepared for an emergency.
For US-95, route segment from kilometer post 140 to 145 has the highest 
population among the route segments. This segment was ranked No. 1 in the 
initial risk analysis. Segments from kilometer post 0 to 50 was ranked No. 2.
Using the results of effective risk analysis, the route segment from kilometer post 
140 to 145 was also ranked No. 1. While segments from kilometer post 0 to 50 
was ranked No. 2, the effective risks along these segments are almost equivalent 
to the effective risk along kilometer post 140 to 145. The result of effective risk 
analysis indicated a need for improving emergency preparedness along kilometer 
post 0 to 50 of route US-95.
For US-93, route segment from kilometer post 15 to 20 (MP 9 to 12) is the 
most critical (Rank No. 1) for conditions when both initial and effective risks are 
considered.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Traditionally, risk and emergency preparedness have been addressed as two 
interdependent issues. However, the interactions between them have not been 
addressed explicitly. Existing risk assessment methodologies for hazardous 
materials transportation events assume that the population within the impact area 
are subjected to the same amount of risk. The population who may have escaped 
the consequence of the event due to a timely and adequate emergency response 
are seldom considered. Emergency preparedness or the availability of emergency 
responders at strategic locations ensures that a response can be provided so that 
the consequence of an accident will be minimized or mitigated. By ignoring 
emergency preparedness, relative risk may be over or underestimated.
A  framework for hazardous materials transportation risk assessment based 
on emergency preparedness has been developed in this research. Typically, risk is 
estimated using probabilistic analysis, which is based on the probability of an 
accident, probability of a release given an accident, and population consequence. 
In this research effort, the probabilistic risk estimate is redefined as initial risk. 
The term "effective risk" is introduced to include the effects of emergency 
preparedness on the initial risk estimates. Emergency preparedness has been
160
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quantified using a factor termed emergency response factor, 6 . The fi factor is 
combined with the initial risk estimates to obtain the effective risk.
Mathematically, effective risk along the route segment i was expressed as follows;
Risk ; = X Risk
C is taken as a function of travel time, number of units available within a 
given response time, and capability of responders. The responders addressed in 
this study are the initial responders which were assumed to be fire units. The 
capability of responders is measured in terms of personnel availability, personnel 
training, general control equipment, and the personal protective equipment. A 
rating method was used to evaluate capability.
The effective risk estimation methodology requires data on the following: 
highway network, population, truck accident, release of materials involved in an 
accident, traffic volume, and emergency response data. Emergency response data 
may be classified further into response time and capabilities.
Travel time index, response capability index, and response unit index are 
three variables used to define 6 . Travel time index is a relationship between a 
response unit’s travel time from the origin station to the scene of an event and 
the FHW A recommended response time of 10 minutes. Response capability 
index measures the capability of the responding unit(s). Personnel availability, 
personnel training, personal protective equipment, and general control equipment 
are used to evaluate capability. Response unit index is an index that measures the
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effects of the multiple response units. The effects of multiple response units were 
evaluated through a simulation process performed in cooperation with the Clark 
County Fire Department Training Center. The total time to complete initial 
response actions was used as a measure in evaluating these effects. The 
relationship was established as a power function. A relationship between the total 
time to perform initial response actions and the number of response units was 
established.
A case study based on three major routes of interest in Clark County was 
used to illustrate the methodology. The study evaluates the risk associated with 
the transport of high level wastes (radioactive materials) along 1-15, US-95, and 
US-93. The analysis utilized a GIS program (ARC/INFO version 7.0.2). Initial 
risk was first evaluated and later combined with an emergency preparedness factor 
to obtain the effective risk. The analysis involve several major processes which 
include analysis of population distribution, probability of accident, response time, 
capabilities of responders, and effect of number of response units.
Initial risk estimates assume equal probability of a release given an 
accident. The probability of an accident was based on truck accident and traffic 
data obtained from NDOT. The study assumes an impact distance of 0.80 km to 
estimate population exposure. The 6 factor is estimated using data from Clark 
County fire stations. The effective risk estimates show a lower risk than the initial 
risk when emergency response is available within 10-minute response window. 
Conversely, effective risk is higher when there are no emergency response units.
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While the differences between the initial and effective risk estimates vary with 
emergency preparedness, the case study shows that the critical links are typically 
the same for both. Some segments of the routes had been highlighted when 
emergency response was considered. These segments should not be ignored, as is 
the case with critical segments. They have either high accident rates or 
population, and inferior or no emergency preparedness capability.
The methodology could be used to perform comparative risk assessment 
with consideration of emergency preparedness. Results of the analysis could 
support policy analysis, design, operational and control strategies, and resource 
management such as deployment of additional resources. In addition, it enables 
identification of various important decision variables such as:
i. segment with highest accident rate 
ii. segment with highest population exposed 
iii. segment with weakest emergency preparedness 
iv. segment with highest risk
8.1 Recommendations for Future Work
Future work may include other improvements to the model such as 
consideration of temporal variation, consideration of non-resident population and 
special population groups, and other factors related to emergency response. The 
following summarizes some of the recommendations for future work;
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Emergency Response
1. Other first responders. While this research deals only with fire units,
there is a need to incorporate other types of first responders such as 
police, sheriff, and ambulance units in estimating B.
2. Volunteer Emergency Response Units. The effects of volunteer response
units on emergency preparedness should be considered. While 
volunteer units usually take longer time to assemble and deploy, 
their importance should not be ignored especially in remote areas, 
or other areas where paid units are not maintained. A penalty 
factor may be introduced to account for the delay incurred by the 
responding unit(s) from the time the dispatch is made to the time a 
unit is assembled.
3. Mobile Response Units or Those Returning to the Station. This research
effort focuses on response units that originate from the station. 
Further studies may be made to address mobile units or those units 
returning to the station whose actual locations could be tracked at 
real-time. Current technological advances have made it possible for 
response units to be tracked using methods such as the Global 
Positioning System (GPS).
4. Capabilities. In evaluating the capabilities of responders, it may be
useful to include communication capabilities, especially when dealing 
with areas with varying ranges of communication capabilities.
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5. Number o f  Response Units. Another simulation process involving more
than five units is suggested for future work to determine the yield 
point or the minimum time at which an increase in the number of 
response unit is not going to reduce the total time required to 
complete initial response activities. The information obtainable 
from this process would be very useful in deploying emergency 
response units, and in maximizing their effectiveness. The 
simulation may also address conditions such as when the material 
involved in an accident is unknown as well as for different levels of 
hazardous materials incidents.
6. Htiman Factors. During the simulation, it was observed that individual
responders have unique characteristics that may account for some 
variation in response time. These factors, which may be categorized 
as human factors, may be addressed in future work.
7. Regional Emergency Response Specialists. While the study focused only
on the first responders, specifically fire units, the presence of 
regional emergency response specialists could also be integrated in 
risk analysis.
Risk Estimation
1. Initial risk estimates obtained using other methods such as RADTRAN 
or RISKIND codes, may be transferred to a GIS environment and
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integrated with emergency preparedness analysis to obtain effective 
risk estimates.
2. Another aspect that may be useful in risk analysis is the quantification 
of perceived risks and establishment of linkages between effective 
risk and perceived risk.
Some of the framework’s limitations pertain to data availability. While the 
databases could be maintained in a GIS environment, an improved method of 
data collection and maintenance is necessary. Logistical and technical difficulties 
were experienced while performing the analysis. The available data came in 
various formats and had to be processed in order to maintain a uniform 
environment. It required more than a beginner’s knowledge to utilize GIS 
programs such as ARC/INFO. An analyst should be familiar with network 
analysis, dynamic segmentation and AML programming in order to perform GIS- 
based effective risk analysis.
With the availability of databases in a GIS environment, a menu driven 
system could be developed to facilitate emergency preparedness analysis and, 
consequently, risk analysis. While the study focuses on highway routing, the 
methodology can also be applied to rail routing.
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APPENDIX A
GIS ANALYSIS
Unix-based GIS ARC/INFO (version 7.0.2) was used in all analytical work 
performed for this study. Several ARC/INFO modules were used extensively, 
namely: ARC INFO, ARCEDIT, ARCPLOT, NETWORK, and DYNAMIC 
SEGMENTATION. In addition, series of ARC Macro Language (AML) 
programs were written to aid the analysis.
Some of the specific GIS ARC/INFO applications in this study involve:
1) Data processing
2) Creation of coverages
3) Creation of a route
4) Response time analysis
5) Estimation of population density
6) Accident analysis
7) Traffic analysis
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In general, GIS applications can be categorized into four subgroups: data 
storage, data processing (linkages with internal and external data), reproduction of 
output, and creation of AML files to facilitate the analysis as illustrated in 
Figure A .I.
It is assumed that the reader has a fundamental knowledge of ARC/INFO 
operations. For a detailed description of ARC/INFO terminologies and/or 
commands, the reader is referred to the Environmental Systems Research 













Figure A.I. GIS Analytical Structure
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Al Operating environment
The analyses were conducted using ARC/INFO (version 7.0.2).
ARC/INFO is operated under the UNIX system on a SUN 690/MP hardware 
platform. W orksheet files in LOTUS 123 format were maintained on IBM 
compatible personal computers and transferred to the workstation via the file 
transfer protocol program.
A2 System of Units
In this research, the analyses were based on the metric system. Lengths (or 
distances) in line coverages were expressed in meters. Milepost listings were 
converted to kilometers, and speeds were expressed in kilometer per hour. 
Accident rates were expressed in accident per vehicle kilometer traveled, while 
population density in person per square kilometer. The following conversions 
were used to translate English units to the metric units:
1 foot = 0.3048 meter 
1 mile — 1.609 kilometers 
1 sq mile = 2.590 sq kilometers
A3 Main Coverages
Two main coverages were used as starting points for the analyses. These 
two coverages are the fire station and the street center line file. Additional 
coverages were created as the needed. Figure A.2 illustrates the process of













Figure A.2. Creation or Update of New Coverages/INFO Files
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creating and/or updating new coverages and/or attribute tables. A  new coverage 
may be created from an existing coverage, or from a route subclass. Existing 
INFO files (attribute tables) maybe updated using JOINITEM  which joins new 
INFO files created from an external data set with an existing one, or INFO files 
created using STATISTICS. Another method of producing a new INFO file is by 
creating event tables using EVENTSOURCE and OVERLAYEVENTS.
A3.1 Fire station point coverage
As mentioned in the text, the coverage containing the locations of stations 
under the Las Vegas and Clark County Fire Departments was obtained from the 
Clark County GIS Management Office (GISMO). These units were represented 
as points which were placed manually based on the description of location of 
facilities as they relate to Clark County street center line file based on the 
information provided by the facility or other sources. Attributes were added 
based on the information provided by individual department. A new attributes 
table was created from a LOTUS 1-2-3 print file to include capability ratings (i.e., 
staff, staff training, personal protective equipment, and equipment). The 
attributes table was combined with the existing coverage.
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A3.2 Street center line file
The coverage containing the street centerline is in state plane (feet) 
coordinate. It was converted into the Universal Transverse M ercator (UTM) 
system using the PROJECT command in ARC module. A travel time attribute 
was added in the INFO table of the street centerline file using the ADDITEM  
command in ARC module. The travel time was calculated using assigned travel 
speeds at various segments of the network. Three speed categories were assigned 
based on the posted speed limits. For US roads and interstate highways, the 
assigned speed is 88 kph (55 mph). For major roads and arte rials, the assigned 
speed is 72 kph (45 mph). For other roads, the assigned speed is 48 kph (30 
mph). This coverage was used to relate the point coverage containing the 
locations of fire stations.
A4 Creation of Routes
Since most of the data use the milepost system, routes were developed 
from selected arcs for individual route to define the starting and ending milepost. 
Initially, a route was created using the road network coverage. The route was 
developed by selecting a path using the ED ITFEA TURE arc command, and 
issuing the MAICEROUTE command in arcedit module. The starting point was 
defined by pointing on the screen. The starting point was consistent with the 0 
milepost definition of NDOT (from South to North, and from East to West). 
Length was used as a measure. The routes were used to define links based on
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various characteristics such as number of response units in a given response time, 
population density, accidents, traffic, and accident rates.
AS Response Time Analysis
The network analysis module of ARC/INFO was used to develop the 
response time contours of individual stations. Individual units were evaluated to 
provide a clear boundary of areas that can be serviced within a given response 
time.
A5.1 Build nodes
A node attribute table associated with the network was built using the 
BUILD command in arc module with the <node>  option. The nodes are later 
used to relate individual centers or locations of fire stations to the network. Some 
centers have no associated nodes, and therefore cannot be represented in the 
analysis. This problem is fixed using the DENSIFY command to assign a node 
nearest to the point of interest.
A5.2 Network analysis
Response time analysis comprises six major steps as illustrated in Figures 
A.3 to A.5. The first step relates the centers (fire station) to the network (street 
centerline file). Fire stations A, B, and C are represented as centers. Step 1 in 
Figure A.3 shows center A being related to the network. Using travel time




1 )  R E L A T E  c e n t e r  t o  n e t w o r k
2) ALLOCATE canter to network
Figure A.3. Network Allocation
impedance, each center is allocated to the network using the ALLOCATE 
command in NETW ORK module. Step 2 in Figure A.3 shows the center A1 
route system created out of the allocation process.
A5J Convert the route system into polygons
An AM L program was furnished by ESRI to automatically convert the 
route system into polygons. This greatly facilitates the analysis. In the absence of 
an AML route system-polygon conversion program, the route system can be 
converted into arcs by manually tracing the route system in A RCEDIT module, 
using the edit feature arc. The arcs were later built to create polygons. The 
polygons define the boundaries that can be serviced by an individual response unit 
within a given response time, T. Step 3 in Figure A.4 illustrates the process of 
converting the route system into a polygon. Step 4 in Figure A.4 shows the
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3 ) Convert ROUTE SYSTEM to  polygon
4 )  D e f in e  p o l y g o n  b o u n d a r y
\  /
Figure A.4. Conversion of Route System to Polygon
converted polygons which are used to define the boundaries covered by individual 
centers within a given response time.
AS.5 Relate polygon (area covered at a given T) to the route
INTERSECT command was used to define the links covered by individual 
response unit in time T as shown in Figure A.5. Step 5 in Figure A.5 shows the 
intersection between the polygons representing the service area o f centers A, B, 
and C and the line representing the route of interest. When all response units 
have been evaluated, attributes were added to the route coverage to identify the 
length of link, and the number of units and name of units that can serve a link
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INTERSECT polygon and arc
D e f in e  l in k  b a s e d  o n  n u m b e r  o f  o v a l l o b l e  u n i t s
L 5 L6L 4Link
No. of Stations 0
Figure A.5. Link Definition Based on the N um ber of Response Units
within a given response time. Step 6 in Figure A.5 illustrates the links defined 
based on the number of response units.
A5.6 Link definition based on the number of response unit
Using the STATISTICS option in A RCED IT module, a statistics file was 
created:
STATISTICS {output file} (num ber of response unit}
SUM LENGTH
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The output file contains the sum of length of arcs in individual links. For 
each response time, links were defined based on the number of response units. A 
link was assigned whenever there is a change in the number of response unit
within a specified response time.
A6 Estimation of Population Density Within an Impact Area
Figure A .6 illustrates the creation of a route coverage with link-based
population density attributes. Links were defined based on population.
A6.1 Definition of an impact area
An impact area along the route was defined using the BUFFER command 
in ARC module, with a buffer distance of 800 m (0.5 mile). The new coverage is 
a polygon coverage defining the impact area of the route.
A6.2 Link definition based on population density
An attribute item, density, is added to the INFO table of the polygon 
coverage representing Clark County population. Individual block density is 
estimated using the data on block population and area. The buffer coverage was 
overlayed on the population coverage using the INTERSECT command in ARC 
module. The population density in each block is multiplied by the area of the 
block, or the polygon formed by the intersection of the buffer and the blocks, to 
estimate the population. The block population and the population of the bisected
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polygon within the buffer are added. Similarly, the area of polygons within the 
link are added. The total population and area are used to estimate the link 
population density, assuming that the population is uniformly distributed within 
the impact area defined for the link. Sections with smaller and/or dense block
R oute 
(line cover)
P o p D en  
(poly cover)
BU FFER
Im pact A rea 
(poly cover) IDENTITY
P o p D e n  w/in 
Im pact A rea
IN TERSECT
R oute with 
Link D elined 
B ased  on 
PopDEN
R oute  witti 
P opD en STA TISTICS
Figure A.6. Link Definition Based on Population Density
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units are considered densely populated. Conversely, sections with large 
blocksand/or few block units are considered sparsely populated. The length of 
individual link was identified using STATISTICS in arcedit.
A7 Accident Rates
Two major data were used to evaluate accident rates: accident and traffic 
data. Since historical data were used, the maximum accident rate within a 
particular road segment (link) was used in the analysis. Accident analysis is a 
complex process because the data are maintained as worksheet files and have to 
be converted into coverages. Coverages were created by relating the accident and 
traffic event data to the route system, the latter being created from the existing 
street center line coverage.
A7.1 Accident data
Figure A.7 shows the process involve in creating a coverage showing 
accident locations and frequencies. Accident data are maintained in an external 
LOTUS 1-2-3 worksheet file. The accident data contain the milepost (kilometer) 
where the accident occur, year of occurrence, severity of the accident, and the 
type of vehicle involved. A print file was created and transferred to the INFO 
system in a GIS environment. An INFO table was defined using these attributes, 
and the values of each attribute added to the INFO table using ADD command: 
SELECT <IN FO >




" S u b c lassADDFROM A cciden t INFO MAKEROUTE




Figure A.7. Creation of Accident Cover
ADD <Item  1>, < Item  2> , ..., <Item  n>  from <Print F ile>
The resulting table is an EVENT table that is used to relate with the route 
system. Dynamic segmentation was used to relate the event data to a route and 
create a route coverage. The number of accidents in a particular location was 
evaluated by adding an item called ACC (accident) on the attribute table and 
assigning a value of 1. The accidents were sorted by year. For each year, a 
STATISTICS command was used to sum up the ACC values on individual 
locations, and store the values in an output file. The output file also includes the
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frequency of accident occurrence in a particular location. The frequency of 
accidents for each year and each location is added to the route attributes table. 
Values of ACC are recalculated as equivalent to the frequency of accidents in 
individual location for each year.
A7.2 Traffic data
Figure A .8 shows the process involve in creating a coverage showing the 
historical variation of traffic. Traffic data are maintained in an external LOTUS 
1-2-3 worksheet file. Traffic data contain information on the beginning and 
ending mileposts, (From MP (KM), To MP (KM)), segment length, and 1989 to 
1993 traffic volume. An item VKT was added to the INFO table to represent the 
vehicle kilometers travelled from 1989 to 1993. Files were transferred and added 
to the INFO table using the procedure similar to that of accident data. The 
accident data were referred to as point event data, while the VKT data were 
referred to as linear event data.
A7.3 Estimation of accident rates
Figure A.9 shows the process involve in creating a coverage showing the 
historical accident rates. Dynamic segmentation was used to relate accident 
(point coverage) and vehicle kilometer travelled (line coverage), and calculate the 
accident rates. Routes were evaluated individually. It was necessary to relate the
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DEFINE INFO NETWORK
j  Route 
1 S u b c lass





Figure A.8. Creation of VKT Coverage
route to an event table, which could be a point or a linear event, depending on 
the feature being evaluated. A point event table was created to establish a 
relationship between the coverage containing the route system and the INFO 
table containing the accident data using the EVENTSOURCE < add>  < point> 
command in arc module.
Similarly, a linear event table was created to set a relationship between the 
coverage containing the route system and INFO table containing the VKT data
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Figure A.9. Creation of Accident Rates Coverage
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using the EVENTSOURCE < add>  < linear>  {...} command. The command 
OVERLAYEVENTS in arc module was used to create an event data which relate 
the VKT and accident data. The latter was used to estimate accident rate by link. 
Once the accident rates were estimated, the maximum accident rate on individual 
link was selected using STATISTICS. The resulting output file was added to the 
accident rate coverage to include an attribute called MAX-ACCRATE.
AS Graphical Representation of Results
Results of the analysis were represented graphically either in chart or map 
form. Charts were created using either PC-based EXCEL or ARC/INFO. Maps 
were created using GIS ARC/INFO Arcplot module. Series of AM L’s were 
written to facilitate the processing of information and creation of graphics files.
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APPENDIX B 
HISTORICAL ACCIDENT AND TRAFFIC DATA
Raw accident and traffic data were obtained from the Nevada Department 
of Transportation. Truck accident data were extracted from the data representing 
all recorded accidents that occur along the major routes of interest. Truck VMT’s 
were estimated from the truck traffic volume. The truck traffic volumes were 
estimated by NDOT as a percentage of the annual average daily traffic.
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APPENDIX C
FIRE STATION DATA
Fire station data were obtained from the Clark County GISMO. 
Supplemental fire data were obtained from individual fire station. These data 
were used to evaluate the emergency preparedness of areas covering the routes of 
interest, which were subsequently used to estimate BETA factor.
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APPENDIX D
EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF MULTIPLE RESPONSE UNITS
The number of response units available for a given travel time has a 
positive impact in terms of timely response and/or mitigation of an event. It is 
assumed that within a given response time, an increase in the number of response 
units will result in an increase in effectiveness of response up to a point where a 
further increase in the number of response unit will no longer have any effect.
The effectiveness of initial responders can be measured in terms of the ability to 
provide timely actions in order to control, mitigate, or minimize the consequence 
of an event prior to the arrival of a special unit, if necessary. Total response time 
will be used to quantify the effectiveness of multiple response units. A term 
called Response Unit Index, RUI, is used for this purpose.
Mathematically,
RUI =  f(N, T n) 
where: N = number of response unit
T^ = total time required for N units to complete an action
203
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The relationship between RUI and N may be linear, exponential, power or 
logarithmic as represented by curves 1 to 3 in Figure D .l. The actual relationship 
between RUI and N was determined by performing an exercise involving initial 
responders using the following conditions:
Travel Time = 10 minutes 
Event: Leak involving Chlorine 
Condition: Single Event, Known Material
D .l Exercise
With full assistance from the Clark County Fire Departm ent Training 
Center, an exercise was performed at the Clark County Fire Training Center.
The exercise was designed to evaluate the effects of multiple response units. It 
was based on the scenario and objectives presented in Table D .l.
Cl
01
Number of  R esp on se  Units
Figure D .l. Hypothetical curves for number of response units
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Table D.l. Scenario to Evaluate Effects of Multiple Response Units
Scenario
An accident occurs along 1-15 (or any road) involving a truck containing 10 
tons o f  Chlorine. The truck was ruptured on the side and started leaking a large 
amount o f Chlorine. Downwind, the area is highly populated (mixed residential and 
commercial). The driver was hurt and needed attention. The H AZM AT unit is 
several hours away from the scene of the accident.
Objective
Determ ine the time it takes to perform the individual activities shown in Table 
D .2. The activities were based on the initial responder’s checklist o f the Clark County 
Fire Department.
Conditions
Simulate the process using five conditions and assuming that the scenario does 
not change for each condition:
1) Only one initial responder came to the scene
2) Two initial responders came
3) Three initial responders came
4) Four initial responders came
5) Five initial responders came
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A total of five observations were performed to satisfy the conditions 
presented in Table D .l. In each condition, the responding unit/units have the 
responsibility to ensure that the 12-item checklist of activities were performed. 
This checklist was a obtained from the Clark County Fire Department, Hazardous 
Materials Response Manual.
Five chiefs from various stations participated, each representing individual 
units. For initial condition, only one unit is assumed to respond. This served as 
the basis of succeeding observations involving 2, 3, 4, and 5 units.
Five observers were assigned to keep track of the activities and the time an 
activity is completed. The total time taken to complete the response actions were 
also recorded. Each observer was provided a stopwatch and a copy of the data 
sheet presented in Table D.2. Table D.3 illustrates how the method of calculating 
total time. For each condition, the time taken to perform individual activity is 
recorded and summed up to obtain the total time.
Results of the exercise is presented in Table D.4 in terms of total time.
The time for individual activity is not presented due to the difficulty of keeping an 
accurate record of the time elapsed while simultaneously keeping track of 
individual activity. In the initial exercise, only a single observer was present with 
the response unit to record the time. For the succeeding conditions, all the five 
observers recorded the times. The results provided by the five observers were 
averaged to represent the average total time.
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Table D.3. Time Matrix for Individual Task
Task Time to respond to an event
0 = 1) 0 = 2) 0= 3) 0=N -1) 0 = N )
Task (i = l) 111; "'v llN
Task (i=2) tzi
Task (i=3) hi I3N
Task ... t... V..: t.J
Task (i= M -l) l(W-l)l
Task (i =  M) Imi w
Total Time (T) T. . . . . . . Tn




Total Time, T^, min:sec Average Time, 
T^, min:sec
Obs #1 Obs # 2 Obs #3 O bs#4 Obs #5
1 - - - - 7:27 7:27
2 4:38 4:39 4:39 4:38 4:38 4:38
3 3:19 3:31 3:34 3:11 3:30 3:25
4 3:42 3:49 3:44 3:43 3:44 3:43
5 3:16 3:17 3:14 3:17 3:14 3:15
The results show a general decrease in response time with an increase in 
the number of response unit except for exercise No. 4. It can be noted that the 
exercise involving 4 units deviated from the trend. This may be explained as 
partly due to some communication problem while the units were deployed.
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During the exercise, the amount of material involved in the accident was not 
clearly stated. This resulted into some confusion because the responder in charge 
of consulting the emergency response handbook provided initial isolation distances 
for both large and small types of spill.
In the first observation the total time is higher than in the subsequent 
observations. This is because only one unit was assigned to perform all the 
activities - from establishing command, requesting assistance to evaluating the 
need for evacuation or in-place sheltering. In the succeeding observations, the 
total time is lower than that of initial observation. This is because the unit who 
assumes the command can delegate the responsibilities to other units, thus 
increasing their effectiveness in terms of minimizing total time.
It should be noted that while the checklist contains 12-items, initial 
responders were unable to perform Items 9, 10, and 12 thus significantly reducing 
the total time. These items include containing spill and run-off, controlling 
ignition sources, and developing intervention strategy.
A  plot of the average total time and number of response units is presented 
in Figure D.2. Using the average total time, the equation that best describes the 
relationship is evaluated using a spreadsheet program and is found to be:
6 . 96A^U0.509)
Logarithmic and exponential relationships were also evaluated but the 
power equation provided the highest correlation coefficient, R*=0.91.
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D.2 Limitations
The number of observations was limited. Additional observations may be 
able to provide the yield point, or the maximum number of units that will provide 
the minimum total time.
Some of the units were asked to perform the same activity, and thus units 
may have acquired expertise while doing the same exercise for a num ber of times. 
Although not accounted in this study, this may have reduced the response time 
significantly.
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